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The Role of Satellites and Smart Devices:
Data Surprises and Security, Privacy, and
Regulatory Challenges
Anne Toomey McKenna,*i Amy C. Gaudion,**ii
Jenni L. Evans***iii
ABSTRACT
Strava, a popular social media platform and mobile app like
Facebook but specifically designed for athletes, posts a “heatmap” with
consensually-obtained details about users’ workouts and geolocation.
Strava’s heatmap depicts aggregated data of user location and movement
by synthesizing GPS satellite data points and movement data from users’
smart devices together with satellite imagery. In January of 2018, a 20year-old student tweeted that Strava’s heatmap revealed U.S. forward
operating bases. The tweet revealed a significant national security issue
and flagged substantial privacy and civil liberty concerns.
Smart devices, software applications, and social media platforms
aggregate consumer data from multiple data collection sources, including
device-embedded sensors, cameras, software, and GPS chips, as well as
from consumer activities like social media posts, pictures, texts, email, and
contacts. These devices and apps utilize satellite data, including GPS, as a
fundamental component of their data collection arsenal. We call this little
understood, across-device, across-platform, and multi-sourced data
aggregation the satellite-smart device information nexus. Given the nature
of the technology and data aggregation, no one escapes the satellite and
smart device information nexus. We explain the technology behind both
*Anne Toomey McKenna is Penn State Dickinson Law’s Distinguished Scholar of Cyber
Law and Policy and co-hire with Penn State’s Institute for CyberScience (ICS). For
complete biographical information, please see the corresponding endnote.
**Amy C. Gaudion is the Associate Dean for Academic Affairs & International Programs
and assistant professor at Penn State’s Dickinson Law. For complete biographical
information, please see the corresponding endnote.
***Jenni L. Evans is the President of the American Meteorological Society, the Director
of The Pennsylvania State University’s Institute for CyberScience, and a Professor of
Meteorology at Penn State. For complete biographical information, please see the
corresponding endnote.
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satellites and smart devices, and we examine how the satellite-smart
device information nexus works. We also address how private industry’s
aggregation of data through this nexus poses a threat to individual privacy,
civil liberties, and national security.
In so doing, we work to fill a marked gap in the privacy and cyberrelated legal literature when it comes to analyzing the technology,
surveillance capabilities, law, and regulation behind government and
commercial satellites together with private industry’s aggregation, use,
and dissemination of geolocation and other data from the satellite-smart
device information nexus. This lack of awareness about the satellite-smart
device information nexus has adverse consequences on individual privacy,
civil liberties, and the security of nation states; it impedes informed
legislation; and it leaves courts in the dark.
A contributing factor to the lack of awareness is that commercial
remote sensing and government satellites are regulated by a byzantine
scheme of international laws, treaties, organizations, and domestic nation
states’ laws that combine to control access to satellite data, sharing of
satellite data, licensing, ownership, positioning in space, technical
requirements, technical restrictions, and liability for harm caused by
satellites. Although the satellite-smart device information nexus involves
staggering quantities of personal information, we examine how the nexus
falls outside the U.S. electronic surveillance and data legislative scheme
and why it is unimpeded by privacy decisions due to a disconnect in U.S.
Supreme Court decisions treating aerial surveillance differently than
location tracking.
We breakdown the complex yet opaque regulatory structure
governing commercial remote sensing and government satellites. We
examine why the Strava event and others like it are—and will continue to
be—the new norm, absent significant legislative and regulatory change.
We conclude by providing a suggested roadmap for that legislative and
regulatory change.
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INTRODUCTION

A Fitbit did that? On January 27, 2018, 20-year old Australian
international security student Nathan Ruser tweeted: “Strava released their
global heatmap. 13 trillion GPS points from their users . . . It looks very
pretty, but not amazing for Op-Sec. US Bases are clearly identifiable and
mappable.”1
Instantaneously, Strava, a social media platform and mobile fitness
app that works with wearable fitness devices, unintentionally
compromised numerous U.S. special ops bases around the world by
posting its “heatmap” of user activity online. Strava’s heavily-marketed
heatmap comprises aggregated data of user movement, developed by
synthesizing GPS satellite data for the movement data with satellite
imagery to give these data a geographic reference.2
On January 30, 2018, The New York Times published a short video
about Ruser’s tweet; it showed with startling clarity how satellite images
combined with Strava’s heatmap data revealed multiple U.S. special ops
bases in remote locations in Djibouti, Afghanistan, and Niger.3 The Times
interviewed Ruser, who mused from his summer vacation in Thailand,
1. Nathan Ruser (@Nrg8000), TWITTER (Jan. 27, 2018, 10:24 AM),
https://twitter.com/Nrg8000/ status/957318498102865920.
2. See Drew Robb, Building the Global Heatmap, MEDIUM (Nov. 1, 2017),
https://medium.com/Strava-engineering/the-global-heatmap-now-6x-hotter23fc01d301de
3. Chritiaan Tribert et al., How Strava’s Heat Map Uncovers Military Bases, N.Y.
TIMES, https://nyti.ms/2DAjwxK (last visited June 20, 2019).
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“Whoever thought that operational security could be wrecked by a
Fitbit?”4 The U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) was left scrambling, and
the national security and privacy law communities were saucer-eyed with
dawning comprehension. A social media fitness app simply was not on the
Pentagon’s radar.5
To be clear: it is not our intent to imply that Strava did anything
unlawful or violated its own terms of use and privacy policies. It did not.
Moreover, Strava provides its users clear options to turn off data sharing.
But the Strava reveal was a national security debacle and flagged
significant privacy and civil liberty concerns. How did it happen? We
explain the data aggregation behind Strava’s heatmap and explain why the
Strava event is the new norm.6 Smart devices, software applications, and
social media platforms – like Strava – routinely aggregate consumer data
from multiple data collection sources, including device-embedded
sensors, cameras, facial recognition software, and GPS, as well as from
consumer activities like social media posts, pictures, texts, email, and
contacts. These devices and apps utilize satellite data, including GPS, as a
fundamental component of their data collection arsenal. This acrossdevice, across-platform, and multi-sourced data aggregation is not being
done by malicious actors, but rather by private industry. Nevertheless, the
non-malicious aggregation of data poses a threat to individual privacy,
civil liberties, and national security.
Law review articles abound that analyze the legal frameworks, ethical
complexities, and technical know-how behind smart devices, software
apps, and social media platforms and their data collection, aggregation,
use, and sale. Likewise, a multitude of articles addressing privacy concerns
and privacy-law based challenges to satellite-based mapping platforms,
like Google Earth. However, there is a marked gap in the privacy and
cyber-related legal literature when it comes to analyzing the technology,
surveillance capabilities, and law behind government and privately-owned
satellites together with the role and use of satellites and satellite data by
the private sector via smart devices and apps.
The two groups – satellite experts/satellite law scholars on the one
hand and cyber technology experts/cyberlaw and privacy scholars on the
other – tend to stay in their own lanes when it comes to analysis of societal
4. Isabella Kwai, What He Did on His Summer Break: Exposed a Global Security
Flaw, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 30, 2018), https://nyti.ms/2vpTfhh.
5. Pun intended.
6. Cf, Ryan Pickrell, Satellite Photos Reveal A Strategic Russian Military Upgrade
on NATO’s Doorstep, TASK & PURPOSE (Oct. 18, 2018, 10:38 AM),
https://taskandpurpose.com/russian-military-buildup-kaliningrad (describing the use of
satellite imagery to detect Russian military activity); SHAPE Public Affairs Office, NATO
releases satellite imagery showing Russian combat troops inside Ukraine, NATO
NEWSROOM (Nov. 26, 2014, 6:14 PM) https://bit.ly/2L7RjVe (same).
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and security consequences flowing from acquisition, aggregation, and use
of data from smart devices, apps, and satellites. Satellites are “up there”
and governed by space and communications law, while “down-here”
earth-based activities are governed by domestic legal authorities in the
fields of surveillance, national security and privacy.
This gap in interdisciplinary scholarship has significant adverse
consequences on an unaware public and the security of nation states. The
Strava debacle made that abundantly clear. Privacy law scholarship has
not comprehensively addressed questions like: How is government-owned
satellite data made available to private entities? Who can own satellites?
Who can access satellite data? How is it that a start-up using aggregated
data from commercial, publicly available sources, such as satellite data,
users’ smart devices, and software apps, can create a national security
crisis overnight? To complicate matters, commercial and government
satellites are regulated by a byzantine scheme of international laws,
treaties, organizations, and domestic nation states’ laws that combine to
control access to satellite data, sharing of satellite data, licensing,
ownership, positioning in space, technical requirements, technical
restrictions, and liability for harm caused by satellites. With few
exceptions, scholarship addressing the law’s regulation of satellites and
satellite data tends to fall squarely in either the traditional communications
and space law camp or within technical and privacy scholarship regarding
satellite technology, capabilities, and advances in these areas.
II.

ARTICLE STRUCTURE AND TERMINOLOGY

A.

Overview of Article Structure

This interdisciplinary paper begins to fill this void in the scholarship
and is structured as follows.
In Section II(B), we address confusion caused by terminology and
provide a list of defined terms as used in this article.
In Section III, we provide an overview of the technical capabilities of
satellites, explain the basics of global position systems (GPS) satellite
technology, and examine how the private sector uses data derived from
and generated by commercial remote sensing satellite systems.
In Section IV, we analyze how smart devices, wearables, apps, social
media platforms (like Strava), and wireless communications operate off
the backbone of GPS receivers, microelectromechanical sensors, and
satellite data. We explore how the private sector harnesses this satellitedevice-software information nexus in ways not fully appreciated by the
public or policymakers.

2019

THE ROLE OF SATELLITES AND SMART DEVICES

597

In Section V, we provide a case study, using the Strava heatmap, to
demonstrate private sector use of commercial remote sensing and GPS and
sensor data.
In Section VI, we provide an overview of the legal and regulatory
frameworks, at the international and domestic levels, that govern space
law, satellites, GPS, and the commercial remote sensing industry.
In Section VII, we provide a summary of the U.S. legal landscape
governing electronic surveillance technologies, and we consider smart
devices and satellite-generated and satellite-derived data in the context of
privacy law, including constitutional concepts and Supreme Court
jurisprudence. Finally, we assess the significant privacy and civil liberty
challenges posed by the proliferation of smart devices, apps, and online
communication platforms when combined with satellite data.
In Section VIII, we describe and analyze the specific threats to U.S.
national security posed by the aggregation of satellite-generated data by
private sector companies. We explore how and why the U.S. national
security establishment failed to anticipate these threats, despite a slew of
regulations that permit the U.S. government to restrict the collection, use,
and dissemination of satellite data. We examine the shortcomings in the
current regulatory regime, and we preview pending developments in the
law. Finally, we explain that the Strava event was only a harbinger of a
persistent and growing threat.
In Section IX, we propose a set of recommendations in broad
brushstrokes to bridge the legal and regulatory chasms in this area while
grappling with the powerful and transformative role that data from remote
sensing satellites plays in our daily endeavors.
B.

Terminology7

In an article tackling technical subjects like satellites, smart devices,
embedded sensors, and data aggregation from a legal standpoint, our
research spanned a wide array of research sources and revealed a
confusing hodge-podge of terminology. The varying terms used by
engineers, legislators, reporters, legal scholars, technical experts, and
attorneys – in many cases to describe or refer to the exact same thing –
leads to continued confusion, lack of understanding, and separation of
knowledge and disciplines. The term “GPS satellite data,” for example, is
alternatively referred to as geospatial data, digital geolocation data,
geodata, GPS, satellite location data, and remote sensing data.
7. The authors gratefully wish to acknowledge the research and citation assistance
with this terminology section provided by Benjamin L. Cohen, J.D., Penn State Dickinson
Law, and Wyatt C. Weisenberg, J.D. Candidate, Penn State Dickinson Law, J.D.
anticipated May 2020.
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To alleviate this confusion, the following terms are defined as
follows:
5th Generation Wireless (5G) is a new form of wireless networking
technology which promises download speeds approximately 20 times
faster than the current 4th Generation (4G) technology. Previously,
wireless networking operated using the radio-frequency spectrum. 5G
marks a shift away from the radio-frequency spectrum to the millimeter
wave spectrum. Unlike the radio waves of prior generations, millimeter
waves cannot easily transmit through obstacles. 5G wireless thus requires
a denser number of cell sites. 5G’s denser network of cell sites allows
increased transmission speeds. 5G simultaneously relies on a trafficsignaling system to identify the most efficient delivery route. The new cell
sites transmit information simultaneously across the same frequency. This
transmission principle can potentially double the capacity of wireless
networks at their most fundamental physical layer.8
Cellular phones are two-way telecommunication devices that are
perhaps best understood as sophisticated radios.9 The root “cell” in cellular
refers to geographic regions often illustrated as hexagons, like that of a
bee’s honeycomb.10 Cellular phones contain a low-power transmitter that
transmits and receives information through a network of cell sites. 11 Cell
phones scan for the cell site that offers the strongest signal in its
geographic area.12 The cell phone performs these scans every seven
seconds or when the signal strength from one cell site or tower weakens,
regardless of whether a call is placed.13
Cell sites, also referred to as cell towers, sit along areas where three
hexagonal cells connect.14 Each cell site or cell tower contains a radio
transceiver and base station controller that receives and transmit verbal

8. See Charlotte Lee, The 5G Economy: How 5G will Impact Global Industries, The
Economy, and You, MIT TECHNOLOGY REVIEW (Mar. 1, 2017), https://bit.ly/2o9T9V1; see
also Amy Nordrum et al., Everything You Need to Know About 5G, IEEE SPECTRUM BLOG
(Jan. 27, 2017, 7:00 PM), https://bit.ly/2OV1Dhh.
9. CLIFFORD S. FISHMAN & ANNE T. MCKENNA, WIRETAPPING & EAVESDROPPING:
SURVEILLANCE IN THE INTERNET AGE § 28:2 (3d ed. Supp. 2018), Westlaw WIRETAP; see
also In re Application for Pen Register and Trap/Trace Device with Cell Site Location
Authority, 396 F. Supp. 2d 747, 750–751 (S.D. Tex. 2005). For a general background on
cellular telephones, see S. REP. NO. 99-541 (1986), as reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N.
3555, 3563.
10. See In re Application for Pen Register and Trap/Trace Device with Cell Site
Location Authority, 396 F. Supp. 2d at 750 (describing cellular phone technology).
11. See id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
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communications from one cellular phone to another.15 Cell sites do not
only process voice data; cell sites also receive location data.
Cell Site Location Information (CSLI) is a time-stamped record of
cell phone’s location that is generated each time a cellular phone scans or
connects to a cell site.16 As noted, cell phones continuously scan for nearby
cell sites. Cell phones connect to the cell site when placing a phone call,
sending text messages, and when using a cellular phone application.17
While the accuracy of the CSLI varies dependent upon the concentration
of cell sites within a given area, the ubiquity of cellular phones results in
an increasingly compact coverage areas, and thereby an increasingly
accurate CSLI.18 With the proliferation of smart phones, mobile apps and
texting communication platforms, “modern cell phones generate
increasingly vast amounts of increasingly precise CSLI.”19 The accuracy
of CSLI is further compounded by the commercialization of location data
CSLI, incentivizing the cellular providers to store CSLI beyond that
required by law.20
Cellular tracking is a surveillance method that uses CSLI to
determine real-time movement and historical movement (over time) by
comparing the difference in signal strength from multiple different cell
sites.21 This process is also known as cellular triangulation and is distinct
from geolocation tracking, which is defined below.
Geolocation data refers to digital geographic data and information
concerning objects or phenomena that are directly or indirectly associated
with a location relative to the Earth.22 Geolocation data reflects the
geographical (latitudinal and longitudinal) location of an Internetconnected device or GPS receiver enabled device.23 Geolocation data
collected from such devices is used, accessed, and disseminated by a
variety of apps, and even other smart devices.24 The geolocation data

15. Id.
16. See Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2211–12 (2018).
17. See id. at 2212.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 2212.
20. See generally id. (noting that wireless carriers often sell aggregated location
records); Enhanced 911 – Wireless Services, FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N,
https://www.fcc.gov/general/enhanced-9-1-1-wireless-services (last visited June 20, 2019)
(requiring cell network providers be able to provide relatively precise locations of persons
placing 911 calls from mobile devices)
21. See Aaron Blank, The Limitations and Admissibility of Using Historical Cellular
Site Data to Track the Location of a Cellular Phone, 18 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 3, 7–10; see
also FISHMAN & MCKENNA, supra note 9, § 28:4.
22. Geolocating
Carmen
Sandiego,
GRAVITATE
(Dec.
14,
2018),
https://www.gravitatedesign.com/blog/what-is-geolocation/.
23. Id.
24. Id.
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collected reflects the geolocation of the device or server, in other words,
“if you leave your phone in your car and go for an hour-long run in
silence . . ., your geolocation history for that hour is the physical location
of your car (according to your phone).”25 In contrast, if “your fitness
tracker traveled with you the whole time on your wrist, its geolocation
history for that hour is wherever you ran.”26 Of course, if your phone is
synced with your fitness tracker or other wearable device, your phone will
collect the geolocation data from the fitness tracker when the two devices
next connect.
Geolocation tracking is a surveillance method similar to cellular
tracking but relies on GPS satellite data captured and stored by GPS
receivers, rather than cell-site location data. Geolocation tracking relies on
a trilateration process, as opposed to triangulation.27
Geospatial data is data that has a geographic component or includes
locational information, such as geographic data in the form of coordinates,
address, city, or ZIP code. Geospatial data can originate from GPS data,
satellite imagery, and geotagging.28 Geospatial data may also be referred
to as location data or spatial data and is emerging as an important source of
information both in traditional and in big data analytics.29
Geospatial technology refers to the technology used to “acquire,
manipulate, and store geographic information.”30 Examples of geospatial
technologies include GPS and remote sensing, among others.31
GPS satellite data means electronic information about the time and
position of a GPS satellite.32
GPS chips or GPS receivers are computer processors that receive
GPS signals from satellites to determine the device’s geolocation. Devices
with a GPS chip typically have wireless connectivity which enables the
device to transmit data to a secondary device, such as a personal computer
or mobile phone.33

25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Daniel Ionescu, Geolocation 101: How It Works, the Apps, and Your Privacy,
PCWORLD (Mar. 29, 2010), https://www.pcworld.com/article/192803/geolo.html.
28. Caitlin Dempsey, What is the Difference Between GIS and Geospatial?, GIS
LOUNGE (Jan. 14, 2014), https://www.gislounge.com/difference-gis-geospatial/.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. See What is WAAS?, GARMIN, https://www8.garmin.com/aboutGPS/waas.html
(last visited June 20, 2019).
33. See Amanda Thomas, How Micro GPS Tracking Chips Work, TRACKIMO (Jul. 26,
2016), https://trackimo.com/micro-gps-tracking-chips/; see also Daniel Rubino, GPS vs.
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Assisted-GPS or aGPS is the combined use of GPS along with Wi-Fi
and cell-tower triangulation (see definition below) to pinpoint the location
of a device.34 Assisted-GPS pinpoints location very accurately, especially
indoors where GPS signals might not be strong.35
Internet of Things (IoT) refers to a decentralized network of
embedded sensors and processors, enabling a range of possible
communications: person-to-device, device-to-device, or device-to-grid.
These systems monitor and manage IoT devices.36
IoT devices are physical objects capable of connecting to the internet,
similar to other smart devices, with a stronger emphasis on device-to-grid
communications to enable data analytics.37
Remote sensing is a method of data collection through instruments or
sensors that act as a proxy to direct forms of information that rely on
physical contact.38
Commercial remote sensing space capabilities as defined in the U.S.
Commercial Remote Sensing Policy “refers to privately owned and
operated space systems licensed under the Land Remote Sensing Policy
Act of 1992, their technology, components, products, data, services, and
related information, as well as foreign systems whose products and
services are sold commercially.” 39
Remote sensing space capabilities are similarly defined in the Policy
as “all remote sensing space systems, technology, components, products,
data, services, and related information.”40 Space systems include the
spacecraft’s remote sensing hardware, software, and cargo as well as the
spacecraft’s ground stations, command facilities, and the connecting
networks. Data processing components and exploitation hardware and

aGPS:
A
Quick
Tutorial,
WINDOWS
CENTRAL
(Jan.
3,
2009),
https://www.windowscentral.com/gps-vs-agps-quick-tutorial.
34. See Tracy V. Wilson, How GPS Phones Work, HOWSTUFFWORKS,
https://bit.ly/2HdZvze (last visited on June 20, 2019).
35. See Jules G. McNeff, The Global Positioning System, 50 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON
MICROWAVE THEORY AND TECH. 645, 646–647 (2003), https://bit.ly/2VpS5Rq.
36. See MCKINSEY GLOBAL INSTITUTE, THE INTERNET OF THINGS: MAPPING THE
VALUE BEYOND THE HYPE 17 (2015), https://mck.co/2gyPezB; see also THE
HAMMERSMITH GROUP, INTERNET OF THINGS: NETWORKED OBJECTS AND SMART DEVICES,
(2010), https://bit.ly/2UXcA8u.
37. See Mayank Singh, Smart, Connected and IoT Device, ENGINEERING ECKOVATION
(Jun. 6, 2018), https://engineering.eckovation.com/smart-connected-iot-devices/.
38. See 15 C.F.R. § 966.3 (2018) (defining remoting sensing system as applied to
satellites); 51 U.S.C. § 60101(4) (defining land remote sensing).
39. NAT’L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., U.S. COMMERCIAL REMOTE SENSING
POLICY FACT SHEET 1 (April 25, 2003), https://bit.ly/2VzywpC [hereinafter REMOTE
SENSING POLICY].
40. Id.
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software with remote sensing characteristics may also be included in the
definition.41
Smart or smart devices are physical objects capable of connecting to
the internet, either directly or indirectly through a network, to
communicate information with other networked devices; and have
computer processing capabilities for collecting, sending, receiving, or
analyzing data.42 Smart has now colloquially become a prefix used to
modify a word, signaling that the modified word has some form of
networking and processing capabilities. Put differently, smart + X refers
to X with the ability of networking and computer processing. For example,
smartcity refers to a city that has incorporated networking and computer
processing technology into its urban environment.
Smartphones refer to mobile or cellular phones embedded with highperformance microprocessors and other sensors powered by a mobile
operating system featuring capabilities like a traditional computer.43
Software applications, or apps, are software programs that function
on top of a device’s operating system, allowing the user to perform all
sorts of tasks from editing documents to playing games. Applications have
been around for as long as computers, but the term ‘app’ is associated with
the software that runs on a smartphone or tablet device.44
Triangulation is the process of determining the coordinates of a point
based on the known location of two other points. If the direction (but not
distance) from each known point to the unknown point can be determined,
then a triangle can be drawn connecting all three points. While only the
length of one side of the triangle is known at first (the side connecting the
two known points), simple trigonometry reveals the lengths of the other
sides and so the position of the third point. In the context of cell site
information, the two known points are the antenna towers, the third point
is the cellular telephone, and the direction from each tower to the phone is

41. Id.
42. See Internet of Things (IoT) Cybersecurity Improvement Act of 2017, S. 1691,
115th Cong. § 2 (2017); SMART IoT Act, H.R. 6032, 115th Cong. § 2 (2017); S.B. 327,
2017 Leg. (Cal. 2018).
43. See What is a smartphone?, LENOVO, https://lnv.gy/2WAIPar (last visited June
20, 2019).
44. See Marziah Karch, A Beginner’s Guide to Apps, LIFEWIRE, (last updated Jan. 04,
2019), https://bit.ly/2HbzNeK; What is an app?, BBC WEBWISE BLOG,
http://www.bbc.co.uk/webwise/0/27488178 (last updated Jun. 2, 2014, 2:26 PM);
Understanding Mobile Apps, FED. TRADE COMM’N, https://bit.ly/28KjSlG (last visited June
20, 2019).
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discerned from the information about which face of each tower is facing
the phone.45
Trilateration is the process of determining the position of a point
based on the known location and known distance to three other points.
When a GPS device receives a signal from a satellite, the system calculates
the distance between the receiver and the satellite, identifying the possible
position of the device as
anywhere within the satellite’s
signal radius. This process
repeats with another satellite.
With two signals, the precise
position could be any of the two
points where the two circles of
signal coverage intersect. This
is still not precise enough,
leading to a third satellite
joining the process, revealing
the device’s precise location
where all three circles intersect. Each satellite is at the center of a sphere
with the GPS receiver found in the location where the satellites intersect.46
Wearable devices describe physical objects such as fitness trackers,
smartwatches, or smart glasses worn by the user with embedded or
integrated processors and sensors that are typically networked to a mobile
device, offering consumers and businesses access to real-time, highly
personalized information.47
III.

SATELLITES: TECHNOLOGY AND INDUSTRY

The possibility of integrating remote sensing data into
local. . .databases and using the databases in conjunction with
locational GPS data has created opportunities for new types of
information applications that were not possible using photographic
remote sensing data alone.48

45. See FISHMAN & MCKENNA, supra note 9, at § 28:4; see also Trilateration vs
Triangulation – How GPS Receivers Work, GIS GEOGRAPHY, https://bit.ly/2Q0kfgz (last
updated Mar. 4, 2019).
46. Trilateration vs Triangulation – How GPS Receivers Work, GIS GEOGRAPHY,
https://bit.ly/2Q0kfgz (last updated Mar. 4, 2019).
47. Disrupter Series: Wearable Devices: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Commerce, Mfg., and Trade, Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 114th Cong. 2–3 (2016)
(statement of Hon. Michael C. Burgess, Rep. from Tex.), https://bit.ly/2WwbhtY.
48. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, USING REMOTE SENSING IN STATE AND LOCAL
GOVERNMENT: INFORMATION FOR MANAGEMENT AND DECISION MAKING 17 (Nat’l
Academies Press 2003).

MCKENNA-FORMATTED FINAL.DOCX

604

PENN STATE LAW REVIEW

Vol. 123:3

After the January 2018 Strava reveal, this 2003 statement from a
National Research Council report proves prescient. The posting of the
Strava heatmap, with its immediate national security impact, demonstrates
this application of locational GPS data from the smart devices onto
satellite-derived topography and land use backgrounds. This section
provides a basic overview of the technical capabilities of satellites,
examines how the private sector uses data generated from commercial
remote sensing satellite systems, and overviews global positioning system
(GPS) capabilities.
A.

Satellites and Remote Sensing

Satellites work in a similar
way to the human eye. Neither
receives information about an
entire object; they sense the
presence (or absence) of a feature
remotely. Touch is direct sensing
– you are in physical contact with
the object. Remote sensing is the
process of acquiring information
about your surroundings without
being in contact with it. Both the
eye and the Earth-orbiting
satellite sense reflected or
emitted energy, then process and
interpret that data into usable information about the world around us.
Satellites carry a variety of instruments to capture different parts of
the energy spectrum, including visible (what you see is what you get),
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infrared (temperature), and microwave (clouds, rain, ice, snow) parts of
the spectrum. Using data from more than one of these sensors in
combination empowers us to distinguish between various types of clouds
and weather systems, different types of land cover (ploughed fields,
grasslands, cities, forests, lakes, ocean), and topography. The end result of
this process is given in
the Landsat example to
the right.49 These four
merged
images
are
developed by combining
information from many
satellite retrievals of the
Smoky Mountains in
each season over 2012
and 2013 and capture
seasonal differences in
vegetation and other
features. In broad terms,
this is the process for
visualizing land surface
information, such as that
in the Strava images.
Aggregation of satellite data by commercial entities includes data
from satellites in orbits categorized as geostationary, geosynchronous, and
semi-synchronous. Geostationary satellites orbit above the equator in high
Earth orbit at an altitude of roughly 36,000 kilometers. This high altitude
is necessary for the satellite to “sit” in a constant relative location above
the Earth’s surface and allows the satellite to lie on the same plane as the
equator. The advantages of geostationary satellites are constant and
consistent views of the same areas. The disadvantage is that the resolution
of the satellite is diminished by distance. Geostationary satellites are
generally used for weather monitoring, and search and rescue beacons.50

49. Holli Riebeek, How to Interpret a Satellite Image: Five Tips and Strategies,
NASA EARTH OBSERVATORY (2013), https://earthobservatory.nasa.gov/
features/ColorImage.
50. Geosynchronous vs Geostationary Orbits, GIS GEOGRAPHY (Feb. 23, 2018),
https://gisgeography.com/geosynchronous-geostationary-orbits/.
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51

Geosynchronous satellites are located in “a sweet spot above the
Earth” where the satellite is able to match the Earth’s rotation.52 Thus, a
geosynchronous satellite’s orbit synchronizes with the rotation of the
Earth, and it matches the time it takes for the Earth to rotate on its axis 23 hours, 56 minutes and 4.09 seconds.53 Geosynchronous satellites move
in a constant low-Earth orbit, with an altitude of roughly 350 kilometers.54
The low orbit and proximity to the Earth’s surface allows for higher
resolution images, and makes geosynchronous satellites particularly useful
for telecommunications and other remote sensing applications. 55
Semi-synchronous satellites orbit in a medium Earth orbit located
approximately 20,200 kilometers above the surface of the planet. Satellites
in semi-synchronous orbit take approximately 12 hours to complete an
orbit, twice as fast as the 24-hour cycle for geosynchronous satellites.
These semi-synchronous satellites make up the global position systems
(GPS) satellites systems that are critical to the aggregation of locational
data.
B.

GNSS and U.S. GPS

To understand how private industries typically interact with satellites
and satellite data, it is helpful to understand the basics of GPS satellite
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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technology as GPS is one of the most commercially common uses of
satellites. Before we further describe GPS satellite technology, it is
important to remember that the Strava debacle was not caused only by
Strava’s interaction with satellites, but also by Strava’s users’ interaction
with satellites. This begs the question: how do individuals interact with
satellites and satellite data? To help answer this question, meet Corey, a
U.S. citizen residing in the U.S. Like many Americans, Corey uses a
smartphone and a wearable fitness device. Corey does not exist, but Corey
does represent the average person. Corey could be you; Corey could be
me. For illustrative purposes, imagine Corey just purchased the newest
iPhone. Corey inputs Corey’s home address into the phone’s navigation
application and begins the journey home. The U.S. GPS system and
Corey’s smart devices go to work to get Corey home. To understand how
this happens, we turn back to the satellite systems at play here. What is
GPS and how does work?
The Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) is the standard
generic term for satellite navigation systems that provide autonomous geospatial positioning with global coverage.56 GNSS is a term used
worldwide, and sometimes used interchangeably with the term GPS
(Global Positioning System). As discussed more fully below, the major
GNSS Systems are GPS (U.S.), GLONASS (Russia), Galileo (European
Union), BeiDou (China), and other regional systems.57
The U.S. GPS is a satellitebased navigation system owned
and developed by the U.S.
Government. The U.S. GPS
constellation consists of 31
operational satellites out of
which 24 are active at any given
time to cover at least 95% of the
earth.58 The satellites fly in
medium Earth orbit at an
altitude
of
approximately
20,200 kilometers,59
as
56. Michael Venezia, What is the Difference Between GNSS and GPS?, SYMMETRY
ELECTRONICS (Dec. 16, 2015), https://www.semiconductorstore.com/blog/2015/What-isthe-Difference-Between-GNSS-and-GPS/1550/.
57. Id. Access to multiple satellites increases accuracy, redundancy and availability at
all times; and if one GNSS system fails, GNSS receivers can pick up signals from other
systems.
58. Space Segment, GPS.GOV, https://www.gps.gov/systems/gps/space/ (last updated
Mar. 21, 2019). For more info on technical aspects of the GNSS, see Technical
Documentation, GPS.GOV, https://www.gps.gov/technical/ (last updated Sept. 5, 2018).
59. Id.
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depicted in the diagram of the U.S. GPS constellation.60 The U.S. Air
Force is responsible for the GPS satellites, and expects to launch its next
GPS satellite in July 2019.
GPS satellites are placed into orbits in such a way that any point on
earth is in the direct line of sight of at least four satellites. GPS satellites
broadcast radio signals that contain the time and then location of the GPS
satellites.61 GPS receivers are “chips” that can read the signals that GPS
satellites broadcast.62 These receiver chips essentially read the digital radio
signals at the frequency in which the satellites broadcast the digital
signals.63 GPS receivers read the radio signals from any four satellites from
which the GPS receiver gets a signal, and then doing some computations,
the GPS receiver infers its own or its device’s position using trilateration.64
Thus, the GPS satellites, apart from broadcasting their own location, do
not take part in the process of gathering geolocation data or geolocation
tracking.65
Fortunately for Corey (or for Apple, the manufacturer of Corey’s
iPhone), civilian use of the U.S. GPS satellite system is free. Because use
of U.S. GPS is free, numerous private companies develop chips
compatible with U.S. GPS.66
How does a smart device use GPS? Recall that Corey is using a
smartphone to determine directions home. Corey inputs the address into a
navigation application used by the smart phone. The navigation app uses
information collected from the GPS chip in the phone to provide Corey
with the fastest route home.67 The phone’s GPS chip receives digital radio
signals at the frequency in which the satellites broadcast the digital signals,
60. Id.
61. GPS satellites have atomic clock in them that allow the satellites to keep very
accurate time and these clocks are adjusted daily to maintain unanimity with time on earth.
GPS satellites have a decided orbit and it is easy to know their location at any given time.
Id.
62. Patrick Bertagna, How Does a GPS Tracking System Work?, EE TIMES (Oct. 26,
2010), https://www.eetimes.com/document.asp?doc_id=1278363.
63. Id.
64. Marshall Brain & Tom Harris, How GPS Receivers Work, HOWSTUFFWORKS 1,
https://electronics.howstuffworks.com/gadgets/travel/gps.htm (last visited June 20, 2019).
Specifically,
for
a
discussion
of
trilateration,
see
id.
at
3,
https://electronics.howstuffworks.com/gadgets/travel/gps2.htm.
65. Wilson, supra note 34.
66. Sarah Laskov, The Plane Crash That Gave Americans GPS, THE ATLANTIC (Nov.
3, 2014), https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2014/11/the-plane-crash-thatgave-americans-gps/382204/.
67. See Manisha Priyadarshini, Which Sensors Do I Have In My Smartphone? How
Do They Work?, FOSSBYTES (Sept. 25, 2018), https://fossbytes.com/which-smartphonesensors-how-work/.
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allowing the application to gather relevant time and location data from the
digital signals.68
As GPS satellites do not actively participate in location gathering but
passively broadcast signals for everyone and anyone to read, billions of
mobile devices and other GPS-chip embedded devices are able to use GPS
simultaneously.69 Recall the assisted-GPS discussion above. When a
mobile app is in use, the app is able to utilize assisted-GPS, which is GPS
receiver chip data in conjunction with Wi-Fi and cell-tower triangulation,
to precisely pinpoint the location of the device.70 Assisted-GPS pinpoints
location with precise physical accuracy, especially indoors where GPS
signals might not be strong.
As noted, GPS is a system owned and operated by the U.S.
Government, and the U.S. can selectively decide to deny any nation access
to GPS data.71 While GPS was initially developed by and for the U.S.
military, free, worldwide use for civilians was enabled in 1983.72 Initially,
the U.S. scrambled the signal to limit GPS accuracy for national security
purposes, but the result was that the U.S. GPS satellites were too
inaccurate for viable use in everyday commercial activities. In 2000,
President Clinton made the unscrambled signal available to the public.73
The U.S. GPS broadcasts in L1 through L5 frequencies.74 Of these,
the L1 and L5 can be used for civilian purposes whereas the L2 has some
frequencies dedicated to military use.75 L2 is encrypted and only a device
with the correct decryption key can access that code.76 The L5 band is a
newly added band that provides an internationally-protected range for
68.
69.
70.
71.

See id.
McNeff, supra note 33, at 646–47.
Wilson, supra note 34.
Ishan Srivastava, How Kargil spurred India to design own GPS, THE TIMES OF
INDIA (Apr. 5, 2014), https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/home/science/How-Kargilspurred-India-to-design-own-GPS/articleshow/33254691.cms. The United States denied
India access to the GPS satellites during the Kargil War in 1999 which led to India
developing its own satellite system consisting of seven satellites that cover the entire
landmass of India. Id.
72. Allegedly, the U.S. made its GPS satellites free and open to civilian use after
Russia shot down a Korean civilian airliner that strayed from its flight path and entered
Russian territory. See Mark Sullivan, A Brief History of GPS, PCWORLD (Aug. 9, 2012,
7:00 AM), https://www.pcworld.com/article/2000276/a-brief-history-of-gps.html.
73. Juquai McDuffie, Why the Military Released GPS to the Public, POPULAR
MECHANICS
(June
19,
2017),
https://www.popularmechanics.com/technology/gadgets/a26980/why-the-militaryreleased-gps-to-the-public/; Clinton Acts to Make GPS More Accurate, N.Y. TIMES (May
2, 2000), https://www.nytimes.com/2000/05/02/technology/clinton-acts-to-make-gpsmore-accurate.html.
74. New Civil Signals, GPS.GOV, https://www.gps.gov/systems/gps/modernization/
civilsignals/ (last visited June 20, 2019).
75. Id.
76. Id.
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aeronautical navigation, promising little or no interference under all
circumstances.77 In the early 2000s, GPS accuracy was about 20 feet;
however, since the deployment of satellites using the L5 band, the
accuracy is up to 12 inches.78 New GPS receivers using this band can pinpoint location to within a foot, anywhere on earth.79
Other countries also have GNSS systems or are rapidly developing
and deploying their own GNSS GPS-like systems. Russia has GLONASS,
a GNSS system with global coverage,80 and the EU has Galileo. China has
engaged in rapid development and deployment, launching 18 GPS
satellites in 2018
alone, and France is
also developing its
own GNSS systems
for
worldwide
coverage.81 The goal
– independence from
the U.S. monopoly on
GPS. This December
2018 techcrunch.com
research graph by
Arman
Tabatabi
summarizes
2018
GPS satellite development and launch activity by major nation states.82
Because the U.S. GPS was the first GNSS satellite system to be made
available for free use by civilians worldwide, device-manufacturers in the
U.S and elsewhere, including cellular and smart device manufacturers,
developed GPS receiver chips that were compatible with the U.S. GPS
satellites.

77. Id.
78. Samuel K. Moore, Superaccurate GPS Chips Coming to Smartphones in 2018,
IEEE SPECTRUM (Sept. 21, 2017, 1:00 PM), https://spectrum.ieee.org/techtalk/semiconductors/design/superaccurate-gps-chips-coming-to-smartphones-in-2018;
Jacob Kastrenakes, GPS will be Accurate within One Foot in some Phones Next Year, THE
VERGE (Sept. 25, 2017, 2:32 PM), https://www.theverge.com/circuitbreaker/
2017/9/25/16362296/gps-accuracy-improving-one-foot-broadcom.
79. Moore, supra note 78.
80. Danny Crichton & Arman Tabatabai, The GPS Wars have Begun, TECHCRUNCH
(Dec. 21, 2018), https://techcrunch.com/2018/12/21/the-gps-wars-have-begun/.
81. Id.
82. Id.
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C. The Commercial Remote Sensing Industry and Its Use of
Satellite Data
Elevate your perspective. Don’t speculate; quantify. Tap into the
DigitalGlobe to extract insights and validate critical decisions.
DigitalGlobe makes valuable location-based information accessible to
those who need it—anywhere, anytime.83

That’s one marketing tagline by DigitalGlobe, one of largest
commercial remote sensing satellite owners and operators. Now that we
understand how satellites work, this section summarizes the commercial
remote sensing industry and describes how private companies collect and
use satellite generated data. In the last few years, significant media and
scholarly attention has focused on the use of unmanned aerial vehicles
(UAVs), or drones by the both private sector and government. While
UAVs provide a cheap and readily accessible means of aerial surveillance
and data collection,84 commercial entities have engaged in aerial data
collection long before drones became part of our lexicon. Private
companies have been capturing and commercializing satellite data and
satellite images of our planet for decades.85
In 1994, the U.S. government granted Lockheed Martin one of the
first licenses for commercial satellite high-resolution imagery. With that
license, the company developed IKONOS, the first commercial remote
sensing system satellite.86 Launched in 1999, it was the first commercial
satellite to collect high-resolution imagery of the Earth, and to make it
publicly available.87 Since the 1999 launch of IKONOS, the number of
commercial actors engaged in the remote sensing industry has expanded
significantly. The commercial remote sensing services market is estimated
to reach $21.62 billion by 2022; that growth is being fueled by defense and

83. Home, DIGITALGLOBE, https://www.digitalglobe.com/ (last visited June 20, 2019)
(italics added for emphasis). (Taglines on DigitalGlobe’s website change frequently. The
above tagline appeared in April of 2019.)
84. See, e.g., Stephen Rice, Eyes In the Sky: The Public Has Privacy Concerns About
Drones, FORBES (Feb. 4, 2019, 10:00 AM), https://bit.ly/2Hes5iU; Domestic Unmanned
Aerial
Vehicles
(UAVs)
and
Drones,
ELEC. PRIVACY INFO. CTR.,
https://epic.org/privacy/drones/ (last visited June 20, 2019); ANN CAVOUKIAN, INFO. &
PRIVACY COMM’R OF ONT., PRIVACY AND DRONES: UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES (2012),
https://bit.ly/30cngz2.
85. See Janna J. Lewis & Lauren R. Caplan, Drones to Satellites, Should Commercial
Aerial Data Collection Regulations Differ by Altitude?, SCITECH LAWYER, Summer 2015,
at 10, 10.
86. Christopher Lavers, The Origins of High Resolution Civilian Satellite Imaging Part 2: Civilian Imagery Programs and Providers, DIRECTIONS MAGAZINE (Feb. 4, 2013),
https://www.directionsmag.com/article/1646.
87. Id.
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private sector use of remote sensing services, supported by satellites, as
well as Big Data applications.88
Two of the most significant commercial satellite players are
DigitalGlobe and SPOT Image.89 GeoEye was a third large player, but
DigitalGlobe purchased GeoEye and all of its subsidiaries and satellites in
2013.90 These commercial entities use their remote sensing satellites to
collect various sorts of data, including images, location data, and real-time
surveillance, and then sell that satellite data to both private sector and
governments. But the raw satellite data is not the only commodity being
sold. These companies also aggregate data and provide geospatial analysis
of the satellite-generated data, and then sell that analysis to app developers,
social media platforms and government entities. Several examples from
the commercial remote sensing industry may prove helpful in appreciating
the scale and scope of the data collection and use.

91

Let’s start with DigitalGlobe. The montage above shows differing
types of images and data captured by DigitalGlobe’s various satellites.
According to DigitalGlobe’s 2018 brochure, its constellation of satellites
88. Remote Sensing Services Market Will Worth $21.62 Billion by 2022: Report,
GEOSPATIAL WORLD (Oct. 31, 2017), https://www.geospatialworld.net/news/remotesensing-services-market-will-worth-21-62-billion-2022-report/.
89. Id.
90. Private Remote Sensing System License Summary of GeoEye-1, NAT’L OCEANIC
& ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN. (Feb. 28, 2013), https://www.nesdis.noaa.gov/CRSRA/files/
GeoEye1.pdf. [hereinafter GeoEye-1 License].
91. DIGITALGLOBE, THE DIGITALGLOBE CONSTELLATION (2018), https://dgv4-cmsproduction.s3.amazonaws.com/uploads/document/file/126/Constellation_Brochure_2018.
pdf.
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“collects more than one billion sq. kilometers of high-resolution imagery
per year—building and refreshing the most comprehensive and up-to-date
high-resolution imagery library in the world as well as offering
tremendous tasking capacity.” The company explains, “You choose the
world imagery you need and the way you need it—online, offline, on your
mobile device or directly into your GIS—and we deliver real-world
perspective you can rely on.”
DigitalGlobe’s constellation of satellites92 is noteworthy for several
reasons. It was the first company to deliver imagery data at full—or 30
centimeter—resolution to its private sector customers.93 Prior to 2015, the
U.S. government was the only entity able to obtain full resolution data; all
other entities received data subsampled down to 50 centimeters.94 In 2015,
that changed when the U.S. government “cleared” DigitalGlobe “to sell”
these “clearer, richer”95 images. Because its satellites move in constant
low-Earth orbit, with an altitude of roughly 600 kilometers, 96
DigitalGlobe has the ability to capture and the advantage of being able to
provide its customers much more detailed images of the Earth’s surface.
The second reason DigitalGlobe’s constellation of satellites is
noteworthy is that the company is dominating the remote sensing market.
In 2008, DigitalGlobe signed agreements with Google, Microsoft, Nokia
and other customers to support their location-based services and mapping
applications by providing access to DigitalGlobe’s high-resolution
satellite imagery.97 Look at almost any recent news article involving world
events, including missile launches by North Korea98 and California’s 2018
wildfires,99 and the credit below the image will say “provided by
DigitalGlobe.” In addition to government agencies and news
organizations, customers for the DigitalGlobe satellite products include
other commercial data providers, including Mapbox100 and Google
92. For an overview of the entire system, see DIGITALGLOBE, supra note 91. In August
2014, DigitalGlobe launched WorldView-3, the company’s eighth satellite at the time. In
the last five years, DigitalGlobe also launched WorldView-4.
93. See
About
DigitalGlobe,
DIGITALGLOBE,
https://www.digitalglobe.com/company/about-us (last visited June 20, 2019).
94. See DIGITALGLOBE, supra note 91.
95. About DigitalGlobe, supra note 93.
96. See Richard Hollingham, Inside the Google Earth Satellite Factory, BBC FUTURE
(Feb. 11, 2014), https://bbc.in/1eqRmxQ.
97. See About DigitalGlobe, supra note 93.
98. See David Brunnstrom, Satellite Images May Show Reprocessing Activity At North
Korea Nuclear Site: U.S. Researchers, REUTERS (Apr. 16, 2019), https://reut.rs/2w52542.
99. See Tariq Malik, Scale of California’s Deadly Camp Fire Shown in Satellite
Photos, SPACE.COM (Nov. 11, 2018), https://bit.ly/2H1AEyH.
100. See Mark Bergen, Startup Mapbox Makes Big Satellite Imagery Buy to Take On
Google, Here Maps, VOX (Oct. 28, 2015, 6:00 AM), https://www.recode.net/
2015/10/28/11620110/startup-mapbox-makes-big-satellite-imagery-buy-to-take-ongoogle-here.
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Earth.101 Of note for our Strava case study below, Mapbox is the company
that created the final product used for the underlying imagery in the Strava
heatmaps.102 Google Earth relies on multiple sources of images to function
including satellite, aerial, 3D, and Street View images. Much of the
imagery in Google Earth is created by stitching together a mosaic of
multiple satellite and aerial images taken over a span of time. Using a
mosaic allows Google Earth to present imagery that may have been
obscured by clouds during the first collection.103
GeoEye, now owned by DigitalGlobe, provides a further example of
how the private sector is using data generated by remote-sensing satellite
systems. GeoEye has a fleet of observation satellites that provide visible
and near infrared (NIR) images of land and sea at resolutions below one
meter.104 GeoEye has provided 253 million square kilometers of satellite
map images to Microsoft and Yahoo! search engines, and in 2013, Google
obtained exclusive online mapping access to GeoEye’s new GeoEye-1
satellite.105 In addition, GeoEye was a major supplier of satellite generated
data to the U.S. government’s National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency.106
With the purchase of GeoEye’s companies and satellites, DigitalGlobe
now fills that role.
Finally, Raytheon’s recent entry into the commercial remote sensing
field is worthy of a few observations. Raytheon, a defense contractor,
developed and sells its SeeMe systems for defense and national security
applications. SeeMe is part of a new wave of remote sensing satellites with
the capacity to provide real-time imagery. On Raytheon’s website, SeeMe
is touted as a satellite provided to the Pentagon’s Defense Advanced
Research Projects Agency under the “Space Enabled Effects for Military
Engagements,” or SeeMe program. Raytheon explains, “the new small
satellite will allow soldiers on the ground to see real-time pictures of the
battlefield, which current military or commercial satellites cannot
provide.”107 But the public summary of Raytheon’s application and the
commercial license issued by Commercial Remote Sensing Regulatory
Affairs Office of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
101. See
How
Images
Are
Collected,
GOOGLE
EARTH,
https://support.google.com/earth/answer/6327779 (last visited June 20, 2019).
102. Nicki Dlugash, Strava Maps for Runners and Cyclists, MAPBOX: POINTS OF
INTEREST (Nov. 3, 2015), https://blog.mapbox.com/strava-maps-for-runners-and-cyclistsdbdb12a279c3.
103. See How Images Are Collected, supra note 101.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
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(NOAA),108 an agency of the U.S. Department of Commerce, presents
another side to Raytheon’s intended use and commercialization of its
SeeMe system.109
In 2015, Raytheon applied for and received a license from NOAA’s
Commercial Remote Sensing Regulatory Affairs Office to launch its
SeeMe satellite, a private, commercial, space-based, remote sensing
system.110 The SeeMe Satellite Remote Sensing License Public Summary,
available on the NOAA website, describes the SeeMe as “the first” of the
multiple satellites Raytheon is developing that is “capable of quickly
providing . . . customers with imagery of their surroundings in realtime.”111 Raytheon’s SeeMe satellite is “about the size of a water cooler
and is cheaper to make and launch than the typical hardware sent into
orbit.”112 SeeMe is equipped with “a camera and a telescope,” with a rapid
orbital period of “about 90 minutes.”113 Raytheon envisions a constellation
of SeeMe satellites, and one of the company’s vice presidents explained,
“[w]ith our automated production lines, Raytheon can produce large
numbers of these highly reliable small satellites quickly and
affordably.”114
SeeMe’s small size, mass-scale production potential, affordability,
and rapid orbital path reflect the rapid technical advancements occurring
in the commercial remote sensing industry. When combined with data
from GPS tracking and smart devices, these advancements result in the
aggregation of data in real-time with consequences that are hard to
anticipate or control. To understand how these consequences come about,
it is helpful to understand GPS satellite technology basics.
IV.

SMART DEVICES

Smart devices, wearables, apps, social media platforms (like Strava),
and wireless communications operate off the backbone of satellite data,
and the private sector harnesses an array of satellite data in ways that are
not appreciated by the public.

108. NOAA’s role in regulation, licensing, and compliance enforcement of commercial
remote sensing activities is discussed below in Section VI.C.
109. See infra Section VI.C.
110. Raytheon Company: SeeMe Satellite Remote Sensing License Public Summary,
NAT’L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN. (Nov. 15, 2015), https://www.nesdis.noaa.gov/
CRSRA/files/raytheon_company_noaa_license_public_summary.pdf.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Small Satellite Work Ramps Up: Diminutive Devices Will Give Troops Real-time
Battlefield Pictures, RAYTHEON, https://www.raytheon.com/news/feature/small_satellites
(last updated Mar. 05, 2019).
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Smart Devices and GPS Receivers

As discussed in Section II.B., supra, GPS receivers are “chips” that
can read the signals that GPS satellites broadcast. These receiver chips
essentially read the digital radio signals at the frequency in which the
satellites broadcast the digital signals, and also gather relevant time and
location data from the digital signals.
Encouraged by affordability and Federal Communications
Commission (FCC) mandates regarding location requirements for
emergency services, most phones today have GPS receiver chips. The
chips are small, inexpensive to manufacture, and consume little power.115
Because the FCC’s Enhanced-911 regulation mandates that cell network
providers be able to provide relatively precise locations of persons placing
911 calls from mobile devices, the FCC E-911 regulation incentivized
companies to include GPS receivers in mobile devices. 116 Using GPS
satellites, the receiver chips can pinpoint the user’s location without access
to Wi-Fi or cellular service. For instance, if Corey was using a location
service app like maps without internet access, Corey would still see a blue
dot reflecting Corey’s location vis GPS, but the blue dot would appear to
Corey on a blank map screen because Corey’s iPhone’s map app would be
unable to download maps to view Corey’s position on the map application.
Wearable devices have built-in GPS receivers along with multiple
types of sensors like motion sensors, optical sensors, etc. These wearable
devices collect relevant data and once they are in contact with a phone via
Bluetooth or the internet, these wearable devices send the data to the
application servers, which store the data for processing and aggregation.
B.

Sensor-based Information Systems117

The recent proliferation of cellular telephones and interconnected
wearable devices provides a big solution to the limitations in GPS
technology, albeit in a small size. In the 1980s, researchers developed

115. Nano Chips Opens New Paths to Smaller Wearable Tech, WEARABLE TECH. DIG.,
https://www.wearabletechdigest.com/nano-chip-opens-new-paths-to-smallerwearable-tech.html.
116. Enhanced 911 – Wireless Services, FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N,
https://www.fcc.gov/general/enhanced-9-1-1-wireless-services (last visited June 20,
2019).
117. The authors gratefully acknowledge the invaluable research and writing assistance
in this MEMS sensors section of Wyatt C. Weisenberg, Penn State Dickinson Law, J.D.
anticipated May 2020.
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microelectromechanical systems (MEMS) sensors.118 Breaking the word
microelectromechanical apart provides an easy way to describe MEMS
sensors:
micro- the size of the sensor is on the micrometer scale (one-millionth
of a meter).
electro- the electric component powers the sensor and records the data.
mechanical- refers to mechanical functionality, i.e., a component that
can stretch, deflect, spin, rotate, or vibration.119

Whereas GPS chips rely on signals from GPS satellites to geolocate,
MEMS rely on tiny sensors that automatically translate tactile physical
phenomena into digital information.120
MEMS sensors are highly sensitive and provide a method of data
collection with both an accurate spatial resolution and, importantly, a wide
dynamic range.121 This dynamic range allows the utilization of MEMS
with multiple sensors, each collecting different kinds of data.122 This
dynamic range also allows MEMS with multiple versions of the same
sensors, further increasing the amount and accuracy of data collection.123
Since the 1980s, both manufacturing costs and the physical size of the
MEMS have continually decreased, allowing the incorporation of MEMS
into consumer-products at mass-scale.124
MEMS sensors are primarily created using silicon,125 which provides
the MEMS’ sensing abilities.126 Silicon, itself, has many useful properties
that allow for the inexpensive creation of MEMS sensors in a highly-pure

118. See Scott R. Peppet, Regulating the Internet of Things: First Steps Toward
Managing Discrimination, Privacy, Security, and Consent, 93 TEX. L. REV. 85, 98 (2014)
[hereinafter Peppet, Regulating the IoT]. “A MEMS device has electrical and mechanical
components, which means there must be at least one moving or deformable part and that
electricity must be part of its operation.” JACOB FRADEN, HANDBOOK OF MODERN SENSORS
626 (4th ed. 2010) (ebook).
119. See FRADEN, supra note 118, at 364–65, 626–27 (describing MEMS sensors).
120. See Peppet, Regulating the IoT, supra note 118, at 99.
121. See FRADEN, supra note 118, at 364.
122. See Peppet, Regulating the IoT, supra note 118, at 99; FRADEN, supra note 118, at
364.
123. See FRADEN, supra note 118, at 364.
124. Alexander Wolf, Little MEMS Sensors Make Big Data Sing, FORBES (June 10,
2013),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/oracle/2013/06/10/little-mems-sensors-make-bigdata-sing/.
125. Note that silicon is a naturally occurring element, not to be confused with silicone,
which is a synthetic compound that is unrelated to this paper.
126. See FRADEN, supra note 118, at 607–08 (describing the use of silicon in MEMS
sensor).

MCKENNA-FORMATTED FINAL.DOCX

618

PENN STATE LAW REVIEW

Vol. 123:3

laboratory setting.127 MEMS sensors take advantage of silicon’s inert
physical effects including radiant,128 mechanical,129 thermal,130
magnetic,131 and chemical.132 Manufacturers utilize silicon’s inert
characteristics because silicon does not require drastic alterations in order
to create a sensor that measures these phenomena.133 The nature of silicon
provides half of the work for the manufacturer.
In addition to silicon’s inert physical effects, MEMS sensors also take
advantage of silicon’s distinct physical characteristics during the
manufacturing processes.134 MEMS sensors rely on a series of microscopic
and highly-precise mechanical structures.135 Recall that the mechanical
root in the term microelectromechanical refers to mechanical
functionality.136 For a visual reference of the scale and nature of MEMS
sensors’ microscopic and mechanical structures, imagine MEMS sensors
not as a computer chip. Instead, imagine a wind farm filled with hundreds
of individual wind turbines each responding to changes in the velocity of
airspeed. Now take that windfarm and shrink it until it fits on the tip of a
strand of hair. This is a MEMS system.
Manufacturers can create these structures using the same thin-film
and photolithographic manufacturing techniques used when creating
electronic circuits.137 Naturally, manufacturers that can outfit their
consumer devices with cutting-edge sensor technology that is highly
precise, inexpensive, and uses the same manufacturing technique that
127. See id. The importance of a highly pure and inexpensive manufacturing
environment cannot be overstated. Accuracy is a core characteristic of any technology that
relies on sensors.
128. Id. Radiant physical effects of silicon include photoconductivity, photovoltaic,
photoelectric, and photomagnetoelectric effects, i.e., measurements of light and light wave
properties.
129. Id. Mechanical physical effects of silicon include piezoresistivity, lateral
photoelectric and lateral photovoltaic effects, i.e., measurements of force, pressure,
vacuum, flow, tilt, thickness.
130. Id. Thermal physical effects of silicon include the Seebeck Effect, temperature
dependence of conductivity and junction, i.e., measurements of temperature, temperature
gradient, heat, entropy. The Seebeck Effect is a phenomenon in which heat is directly
converted into electricity.
131. Id. Magnetic physical effects of silicon include magnetoresistance and the Hall
and Suhi effects, i.e., measurements of magnetic field intensity, flux density, permeability.
132. Id. Chemical physical effects of silicon include ion-sensitivity field effects, i.e.,
measurements of concentration, toxicity, pH (acidity) levels, and reduction potentials.
133. See FRADEN, supra note 118, at 364 (describing MEMS sensors).
134. See FRADEN, supra note 118, at 364–65 (describing the use of silicon in MEMS
sensor).
135. Id. (describing MEMS sensors).
136. Id.
137. See FRADEN, supra note 118, at 608.
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company employs when producing electric circuits, will always choose to
do so. Thus, we see the rise of phones, wearables, and everyday objects
equipped with MEMS—the rise of the Internet of Things.138 In 1999,
researchers coined the term “Internet of Things” (IoT) to describe this
process.139 MEMS sensors are now present in cars, phones, health devices,
and toys.140
Cellular telephone and wearable device manufacturers are two
industries that equip MEMS sensors into their products.141 Although the
manufacturer advertises the phone’s many features, consumers are
generally unaware that MEMS sensors are behind many of these new
features.142 Subsequently, consumers are uninformed of how MEMS
sensors interact with satellite-based technology.
Recall Corey’s journey home. Corey is using a navigation application
that relies on the smart phones GPS chip to read the signals from GPS
satellites that detail Corey’s location relative to the location of Corey’s
house.143 The navigation application also relies on MEMS sensors in the
phone to assist in Corey’s journey. A magnetometer sensor on the phone
acts as a compass by measuring the direction to the Earth’s ambient
magnetic field.144
On Corey’s drive home, Corey accidentally turns too sharply, causing
the new phone to slide off Corey’s lap. Accelerometers, measuring the
phone’s amount of acceleration, vibration, and tilt, record the speed Corey
is driving and the speed of the phone as it slides off Corey’s lap.145 When
Corey retrieves the phone from the floor of the car, Corey accidentally
holds it upside down. A gyroscopic sensor, recording the axis of the
phone’s position, processes this data and automatically re-orients the
content on the screen from vertical to horizontal.146

138. See Scott R. Peppet, Freedom of Contract in an Augmented Reality: The Case of
Consumer Contracts, 59 UCLA L. REV. 676, 699 (2012).
139. Duncan McFarlane, The Origins of the Internet of Things, REDBITE (Jun. 26,
2015), https://bit.ly/2rFx5VY (attributing the coining of the phrase, “Internet of Things,”
to Kevin Ashton, co-founder of the Auto-ID Center at the Massachusetts Institute of
Technology).
140. See Peppet, Regulating the IoT, supra note 118, at 98.
141. See Kevin Webach, Sensors and Sensibilities, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 2321, 2323
(2007) (describing the pervasiveness of networked sensors).
142. See Peppet, Regulating the IoT, supra note 118, at 145.
143. See supra notes 67-70 and accompanying text.
144. See id. The presence of a magnetometer sensor also allows phones to become a
pseudo-metal detector. See Alexandr Balyberdin, Metal Detector, ITUNES STORE,
https://itunes.apple.com/us/app/metal-detector/id409682366?mt=8 (last visited June 20,
2019).
145. See Priyadarshini, supra note 67.
146. See id.
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Cell phones are not the only devices equipped with MEM sensors.
An ever-increasing array of smart devices contain many of the same
sensors as phones and subsequently record much of the same data.147 After
successfully retrieving the phone from the car floor, Corey realizes that he
is about to crash into another car. Corey’s Fitbit, a wearable fitness tracker,
records Corey’s increased heart rate as he realizes the impending car
crash.148 The Fitbit lets Corey know that Corey’s heart rate is above the
average beats per minute and, as Corey’s car is screeching to a stop,
recommends a guided breathing session to aid in lowering Corey’s heart
rate.149
The above hypothetical paints an admittedly incomplete picture of
the scale of data creation, collection, and analytics following the mass
integration of MEMS sensors into everyday life. Indeed, MEMS sensors
surrounded Corey throughout the day, continuously collecting Corey’s
data. Corey’s wearable device (with which Corey uses the Strava app) is
embedded with MEMS sensors and a GPS chip. Corey’s car has a host of
MEMS sensors and a GPS chip–continually connecting with U.S. GPS
satellites. Corey’s home is replete with smart devices embedded with an
array of MEMS sensors, GPS chips, and audio-video recording devices all
collecting Corey and others’ data, including Corey’s doorbell, Corey’s
vacuum, Corey’s personal assistant device, Alexa, Corey’s smart TV,
Corey’s laptop, Corey’s printer, Corey’s iPad, and Corey’s refrigerator.
Corey’s employment place provides no relief from this as Corey is also
surrounded by MEMS sensor/GPS chip embedded smart devices.
Researchers estimate that by 2020, approximately 50 billion internet
capable devices will have internet connectivity.150 Worldwide shipments
of MEMS is expected to grow to 20.2 billion individual units by 2022.151

147. Other common sensors include barometers (measures air pressure), proximity
sensors (measures the distance between an object and the sensor), ambient light sensors
(allows the device to adjust brightness), oscillators (for the internal clock). See David
Nield, All the Sensors in Your Smartphone, and How They Work, GIZMODO (July 23, 2017),
https://gizmodo.com/all-the-sensors-in-your-smartphone-and-how-they-work1797121002.
148. See generally FITBIT, https://www.fitbit.com/home (last visited June 20, 2019).
149. See Here’s Why You’ll Love Relax, Fitbit’s New Guided Breathing Experience,
FITBIT (Aug. 29, 2016), https://blog.fitbit.com/heres-why-youll-love-fitbits-new-guidedbreathing-experience/.
150. See Mariano-Florentino Cuellar, A Simpler World: On Pruning Risks and
Harvesting Fruits in an Orchard of Whispering Algorithms, 51 U.C. DAVIS L.R. 27, 27
(2007).
151. David Manners, MEMS to Take 73% of Sensor Market This Year, ELECTRONICS
WEEKLY (Sept. 5, 2018), https://www.electronicsweekly.com/news/business/mems-take73-sensor-market-year-2018-09/.

2019

THE ROLE OF SATELLITES AND SMART DEVICES

621

The growth of MEMS sensors alters society’s acceptance of the
incorporation of MEMS sensors into consumer devices and the amount of
information that is collected. However, MEMS sensors and GPS chips in
phones and other devices are merely sources of data.
C.

Software Applications

Smart devices rely on programs and applications to interpret the data
and allow users to interact with the data.152 While smart devices use
proprietary programs created by the manufacturer to operate their various
features, many devices also allow consumers to download applications and
programs through a marketplace.153 Recall that GPS receivers can
calculate the location periodically and send it to the apps that have location
access.154 These apps then use this information to do whatever they need
the location data to accomplish, e.g., the Strava app.155
Software developers, like Strava, create programs that use the GPS
chips and MEMS sensors in the phone.156 The openness of application
marketplaces, as well as the desire to create the next big application,
creates an extremely competitive application marketplace, where
consumer preference trends towards free applications.157 With traditional
sources of revenue lost, application developers increasingly rely on data
as a source of revenue.158
How the phone and device applications interact with these sources of
data is governed by agreements between the application marketplace,
usually owned by the device manufacturer, and the developers.159 A
consumer that downloads the application can further limit the
application’s access to these sources of information.160 The consumer’s
ability to limit application access to such information, however, is

152. See supra notes 67-70 and accompanying text.
153. See Artyom Dogtiev, App Download and Usage Statistics (2018), BUSINESS OF
APPS (updated Feb. 16, 2019), http://www.businessofapps.com/data/app-statistics/ (“An
app store (or app marketplace) is a type of digital distribution platform for smartphone,
tablet, and software developers.”).
154. See supra notes 67-70 and accompanying text.
155. See Robb, supra note 2 (describing the creation of Strava’s Global Heatmap).
156. See id. (describing how Strava created their Global Heatmap through movement
data provided by their users).
157. See Dogtiev, supra note 153 (noting the different types of marketplaces and the
governance structure).
158. See generally Lawrence Lessig, The Law of the Horse: What Cyberlaw Might
Teach, 113 HARV. L. REV. 501 (1996).
159. See Dogtiev, supra note 153.
160. See Advertising & Privacy, APPLE (Sept. 17, 2018), https://support.apple.com/enus/HT205223 (describing application and advertising preferences).
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hampered by application settings that require the consumer to
affirmatively act to opt-out—consent is assumed by default.161
V.

CASE STUDY: PRIVATE SECTOR AGGREGATION OF
COMMERCIAL REMOTE SENSING, GPS, AND SENSOR
DATA - THE STRAVA HEATMAP

Strava describes itself as “the social network for athletes.”162 The
Strava app “syncs with most devices,” including “phone, GPS watch or
head unit, heart rate monitor or power meter” to record user data and
performance metrics.163 Strava encourages users to share and upload to its
platform user pictures and other data about user activities.164 Strava
provides a feature it calls “Beacon” that, when turned to “on” mode,
enables Strava users to share their location in real time.165 Beacon and
other features of the Strava app are heavily dependent on GPS receiver and
MEMS sensor data collected from synced user devices; this includes its
trademark heatmap feature.166 The scale of and amount of data depicted in
the Strava heatmap is impressive: Strava’s heatmap reflects 700 million
user activities, visualizes 1.4 trillion latitude/longitude points (gathered
from user synced devices that collect GPS data), and 7.7 trillion pixels are
rasterized to visually depict over 10 billion miles of user activities.167
Remarkably, according to Strava, its “full global heatmap was built across
several hundred machines in just a few hours, with a total compute cost of
only a few hundred dollars.”168
In creating its heatmap, Strava compiles data location tracks only
from users who have consented to their geolocation data being collected.
However, the default setting appears to be opt-in, and it is unclear if the
functionality of certain app features is comprised when a user chooses to
161. See id.
162. Features, STRAVA, https://www.strava.com/features (last visited June 20, 2019).
163. Id.
164. Id. Uploaded pictures would necessarily include all metadata associated with the
uploaded digital image file.
165. Id.
166. Id. However, it is unclear from Strava’s public information about its heatmap
construction how much of this data is pure GPS location data or gathered from assistedGPS (also using Wi-Fi and cellular location data). As discussed in Part IV, supra, most
wearable devices and health apps use GPS to determine location at shortly-spaced periodic
intervals and then upload the data onto the company servers. These devices have internal
computational capacity to determine speed, elevation, etc. of the users. Further, most of the
sensing components are independent of the internet, like motion sensors, accelerometers,
temperature sensors, optical sensor to measure pulse, heartbeat sensors, etc.
167. Id.
168. Id.
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opt-out of location tracking and sharing. The heatmap depicts a snapshot
of data aggregated from over a period of two years; and while Strava offers
real time location tracking via the Beacon feature, the heatmap does not
reflect activities in real time but only historical data. After the Strava
heatmap reveal in January 2018, Strava now updates the heatmap every
month to clear the data of the people who chose to not share their
location.169 The amount of information accumulated to generate the
heatmap is about 5 Terabytes; for contextual reference, that is about as
much data as the Hubble Space Telescope generates in 6 months!170
Strava accumulates the raw activity data (running, biking, skiing,
swimming) generated by the participating athletes, then goes through a
series of steps to “clean up” the data, removing obvious errors.171
Incompatible corrections for location from other devices (such as GPS in
smartphones) are addressed to create a quality-controlled activity dataset.
These data are now accumulated by location into pixels with resolution of
4 square meters (about 43 square feet). This means that a runner covering
2 meters in a straight line will have moved from one pixel to another.
These data are smoothed by a process known as rastering to create paths
that capture how frequently that path has been used (the path “counts”).
This is the raw heatmap data. Because we want to see all popular running
paths, not just those along a bicycle path in the city or a university running
track, Strava “normalizes” the paths. This means that the largest count value
in an area about 5 km across is used to scale all of the other counts. For
example, if 300 people run along the city bicycle path, 150 people use the
university running track, and 75 people run along a local road, this will show
up as 1 (hot), 0.5 (moderate) and 0.25 (cool) on the heatmap. Outside of the
city, there may be only 20 runners along the river, and 5 runners along a
trail; these values would show up as 1 (hot) and 0.25 (cool) on the heatmap
for that rural location. In this way, athletes of all types and locations can see
the popular locations for their sport.

169. Heatmap updates, STRAVA (Mar. 13, 2018), https://blog.strava.com/press/
heatmap-updates/.
170. Terabytes, Gigabytes, & Petabytes: How Big Are They?, LIFEWIRE (Jan. 7, 2019),
https://www.lifewire.com/terabytes-gigabytes-amp-petabytes-how-big-are-they-4125169.
171. See Robb, supra note 2. Examples of data that are excluded as errors are: athletes
who have stopped moving but are still recording their location (which would otherwise
create a bullseye on a heatmap), runners recording speeds typical of bicyclists, and runners
or bicyclists recording speeds typical of cars or even airplanes.

MCKENNA-FORMATTED FINAL.DOCX

624

PENN STATE LAW REVIEW

Vol. 123:3

In this figure of
the San Francisco
Bay area, Strava
activity data has been
normalized so that a
wide range of heat
data is visible in the
image and values
have been smoothed
to change slowly
across the region so
that there are no sharp
boundaries.172
The
final activity data is
combined with the
Mapbox land image
product (images that
originated
with
DigitalGlobe)
to
create a highly effective data visualization.
For purposes of this article and to grasp the complexity of the satellite
and smart device data aggregation dilemma, it helps to remember two
aspects of the Strava case study: (1) Strava collects copious amounts of
user data, in some instances from multiple user-synced smart devices,
including GPS, assisted-GPS location data using cellular data, along with
other smart device MEMS sensor data to record intimate health details to
measure user “performance” and (2) that the copious amounts of data,
including GPS satellite data, being aggregated by Strava to create the
heatmap are able to be processed for only a “few hundred dollars” of
computing costs.173
When Nathan Ruser tweeted about Strava’s recently published
heatmap, the complex privacy and challenging national security
implications resulting from inexpensive aggregation of smart device and
readily available satellite data were on display for the world to see. As
reported by The Guardian, in remote locations in Afghanistan, Djibouti
and Syria, Strava users seem to be “almost exclusively foreign military

172. See Robb, supra note 2.
173. Id.
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personnel.”174 The end result: covert and forward operating bases stand out
brightly on Strava’s heatmap.175
VI.

SATELLITES AND REMOTE SENSING: LEGAL AND
REGULATORY FRAMEWORK

The scheme of international laws, treaties, domestic nation states’
laws, and organizational bodies that regulate and control satellite
licensing, ownership, technical requirements, restrictions, and assignment
of liability is byzantine. In this section, we note key international legal
authorities governing satellites, address regulation of the U.S. GPS
system, and then explain the U.S. regulatory and licensing regime for
commercial remote sensing entities. Aspects of U.S. law that specifically
regulate satellites from a national security perspective are discussed in
Section VIII below, because national security-related satellite directives
are integral to that section’s analysis of the national security implications
created by satellite proliferation and satellite and smart device data
aggregation by the private sector.
A.

International Law and Regulation

The international legal regime governing satellite operations and
communications is complicated and suffers from a siloed approach. First,
it includes a body of law governing the use of outer space by governments
and private actors, the most notable of which are: 1967 Treaty on
Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use
of Outer Space (Outer Space Treaty); 1972 Convention on International
Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects (Liability Convention);
1975 Convention on Registration of Objects launched into Outer Space
(Registration Convention); and 1987 Principles Relating to Remote
Sensing of the Earth from Outer Space (UN Remote Sensing Principles).
Second, the international framework governing satellites includes a body
of law specific to communications and trade law, and includes the
International Telecommunications Union (ITU), and the 1947 General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).
While a full discussion of these authorities is beyond the scope of this
article (and available in other sources176), a few key principles are worth
174. Alex Hern, Fitness Tracking App Strava Gives Away Location of Secret Location
of
US
Army
Bases,
THE
GUARDIAN
(Jan.
28,
2018),
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/jan/28/fitness-tracking-app-gives-awaylocation-of-secret-us-army-bases.
175. Id.
176. See generally Frans G. von der Dunk, Legal Aspects of Satellite
Communications—A Mini Handbook, J. TELECOMM. & BROADCASTING L., Sept. 2015, at 1
(India), available at http://bit.ly/2EcTIrS; Michael R. Hoversten, U.S. National Security
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discussing. First, the concept of space as a “global commons” or “common
interest.” This concept is derived from Article I of the Outer Space Treaty,
which provides that outer space “shall be free for exploration and use by
all States without discrimination of any kind, on a basis of equality and in
accordance with international law, and there shall be free access to all
areas of celestial bodies.” Similarly, Article II provides that outer space
should not be subject to “national appropriation by claim of sovereignty,
by means of use or occupation, or by any other means.” Taken together,
these provisions undergird the “global commons” principle: the idea that
“states cannot dictate the activities of others in space.”177 Second, the
concept of “open skies” is particularly relevant to remote sensing
activities. Embodied in a non-binding resolution, the “open skies” concept
permits states to freely sense and distribute data from outer space without
the consent of the sensed state.
B.

Regulation of U.S. GPS System

As noted in Section III.B., the U.S. GPS is a satellite-based
navigation system owned and developed by the U. S. Government.
Pursuant to 10 U.S. Code § 2281, Global Positioning System, the U.S. GPS
is regulated and operated by the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD).
Section 2281(a) of the Code requires the Secretary of Defense to sustain
“the capabilities” of GPS and the “operation of basic GPS services”178 for
the national security interests, and Section 2281(b) specifically directs the
DOD to sustain and operate the GPS system for “civilian purposes.”179
Civilian purposes are described as “peaceful civil, commercial, and
scientific uses,” and DOD is directed to provide access to the GPS system
“on a continuous worldwide basis free of direct user fees.”180 Under the
civilian purposes section, the Secretary of Defense is mandated to:
coordinate with the Secretary of Transportation to develop and augment
basic GPS to enhance civilian uses of GPS to support of transportation;181
coordinate with the Secretary of Commerce, the U.S. Trade
and Government Regulation of Commercial Remote Sensing from Outer Space, 50 A.F. L.
REV. 253, 260–65 (2001).
177. Hoversten, supra note 176, at 261.
178. 10 U.S.C. § 2281 (2012 & Supp. 2017) defines “basic GPS services” as: “the
following components of the Global Positioning System that are operated and maintained
by the Department of Defense: (A) The constellation of satellites. (B) The navigation
payloads that produce the Global Positioning System signals. (C) The ground stations, data
links, and associated command and control facilities.”
179. Id. § 2281(b).
180. Id.
181. Id. § 2281(b)(2).
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Representative, and other officials to facilitate development of “new and
expanded civil and commercial” GPS uses;182 and to develop measures to
prevent “hostile use of the GPS in a particular area without hindering
peaceful civil use of the system elsewhere.”183
It is a tall order: provide free, worldwide GPS satellite access and
promote new and expanded civil and commercial uses of the system, but
do not impair national security. The proliferation of GPS-enabled devices
and the seamless integration of GPS data into app and IOT device
functioning demonstrates DOD’s successful operation of the U.S. GPS
system for civilian purposes. Smart devices embedded with GPS receiver
chips, which use the U.S. GPS system as a means of geolocation,
necessarily have used U.S. GPS compliant receiver chips. But the
domination of the U.S. GPS system is under direct threat as China and
other nations are developing and launching their own GNSS global
satellite systems.184 While many smart devices are currently manufactured
embedded with GPS receiver chips compliant and compatible with the
U.S. GPS system, that is rapidly changing as other nations are achieving
full coverage with their own GNSS satellites.185
C.

U.S. Regulation of Commercial Remote Sensing

In the U.S., the federal agency that primarily regulates commercial
remote sensing is the U.S. Department of Commerce’s National Oceanic
and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) and, to a lesser extent, the
Federal Communications Commission (FCC).186 For purposes of this
article, we only focus on NOAA’s regulatory role and not FCC, because it
is NOAA that operates the Commercial Remote Sensing Regulatory
Affairs Office (CRSRA) and is tasked with licensing and regulating U.S.
launched, commercially-owned remote sensing space systems.187 It is
curious and worthy of comment that NOAA, albeit an agency under the
Department of Commerce, quietly regulates and licenses the U.S.’s multibillion dollar commercial remote sensing industry. The average citizen
more likely associates NOAA with weather and climate science.

182. Id. § 2281(b)(3).
183. Id. § 2281(b)(4).
184. See supra Section III.B.
185. See supra Sections III.B, IV.A.
186. Lewis & Caplan, supra note 85, at 10–11; Compliance and Monitoring, NAT’L
OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., https://www.nesdis.noaa.gov/CRSRA/
complianceHome.html (last visited June 20, 2019).
187. See Compliance and Monitoring, supra note 186.
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NOAA’s CRSRA currently operates under authority from the
National and Commercial Space Programs Act of 2010188 (NCSPA), the
Land Remote Sensing Policy Act of 1992,189 and pursuant to two
presidential directives: the National Space Policy of the United States of
America190 (referred to as “U.S. National Space Policy”) and the U.S.
Commercial Remote Sensing Policy.191 NOAA’s CRSRA can and does
require specific limitations on the operational performance of commercial
satellites.192
NOAA’s Commercial Remote Sensing Regulations are set forth in
15 C.F.R. Part 960, entitled, Licensing of Private Land Remote-Sensing
Space Systems193 (C.F.R. 960). Of note, the U.S. Department of Commerce
and NOAA are currently revising C.F.R. 960, advanced notice of
rulemaking was published in the Federal Register on June 29, 2018, with
a goal of a full re-write of commercial remote sensing licensing regulations
by December 2019. The stated purpose of the complete re-write of C.F.R.
960 is to “facilitate the continued growth of this critical industry and
update the regulatory regime to address significant technological
developments, new business models, and increased foreign
competition . . . .”194 While this advanced notice of rule-making was
published in the Federal Register, it was not widely disseminated beyond
that. During the notice period from June to August 2018, only ten
comments were received. In reviewing the Advisory Committee on
Commercial Remote Sensing (ACCRES) notes, there was no discussion
of privacy and electronic surveillance concerns, the Fourth Amendment,
or across-device data aggregation implications like the Strava scenario.195

188. National and Commercial Space Programs Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-314, 124
Stat. 3328 (2010) (codified as amended at 51 U.S.C.).
189. Land Remote Sensing Policy Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-555, 106 Stat. 4163
(1992) (codified as amended at 51 U.S.C. ch. 601).
190. EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, NATIONAL SPACE POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES
OF AMERICA (June 28, 2010), available at https://www.nesdis.noaa.gov/
CRSRA/files/national_space_policy_6-28-10.pdf [hereinafter NATIONAL SPACE POLICY].
191. REMOTE SENSING POLICY, supra note 39; see also Authorities, NAT’L OCEANIC &
ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., https://www.nesdis.noaa.gov/CRSRA/generalAuthorities.html
(last visited June 20, 2019)
192. Id.
193. 15 C.F.R. pt. 960 (2018).
194. Licensing Private Remote Sensing Space Systems, 83 Fed. Reg. 30592 (proposed
June 29, 2018).
195. See generally 24th Meeting of the ACCRES Committee, NAT’L OCEANIC &
ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., ADVISORY COMM. ON COMMERCIAL REMOTE SENSING (Oct. 18,
2018),
https://www.nesdis.noaa.gov/CRSRA/pdf/ACCRES_24_Meeting_Minutes_final.pdf.
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We address privacy and national security considerations for these new
regulations below in Sections VIII and IX.
NOAA’s CRSRA compliance and monitoring mission is “to facilitate
the United States commercial remote sensing industry and promote
collection and widespread availability of Earth remote sensing data, while
preserving essential U.S. national security interests . . . .”196 In its
introduction, the U.S. National Space Policy affirmatively acknowledges
the commercial value and societal changes facilitated by commercial
satellites in space, characterizing their use as the “now ubiquitous and
interconnected nature of space capabilities and the world’s growing
dependence on them . . . .”197
The 2003 U.S. Commercial Remote Sensing Policy, a Presidential
Directive, also provides authority for NOAA’s CRSRA to regulate and
support: (1) the licensing and operation of U.S. commercial remote
sensing space systems; and (2) the United States Government use of
commercial remote sensing space capabilities. To support its goals, the
U.S. Commercial Remote Sensing Policy creates a strong and supportive
marriage between the U.S. Government and private, commercial remote
sensing actors, specifically stating in the Fact Sheet accompanying the
Policy that the U.S. Government will:


Rely to the maximum practical extent on U.S. commercial
remote sensing space capabilities for filling imagery and
geospatial needs for military, intelligence, foreign policy,
homeland security, and civil users;



Focus United States Government remote sensing space
systems on meeting needs that cannot be effectively,
affordably, and reliably satisfied by commercial providers
because of economic factors, civil mission needs, national
security concerns, or foreign policy concerns;



Develop a long-term, sustainable relationship between the
United States Government and the U.S. commercial remote
sensing space industry;



Provide a timely and responsive regulatory environment for
licensing the operations and exports of commercial remote
sensing space systems; and



Enable U.S. industry to compete successfully as a provider of
remote sensing space capabilities for foreign governments

196. About Commercial Remote Sensing Compliance & Monitoring, NAT’L OCEANIC
& ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., https://www.nesdis.noaa.gov/CRSRA/complianceHome.html
(last updated Oct. 11, 2018).
197. NATIONAL SPACE POLICY, supra note 190, at 1.
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and foreign commercial users, while ensuring appropriate
measures are implemented to protect national security and
foreign policy.198

The U.S. National Space Policy specifically and intentionally
advances commercial remote sensing for domestic society benefits,199
while simultaneously the NOAA licensing requirements and C.F.R. 960
mandate that commercial remote sensing companies share data gathered
from commercial remote sensing activities with the U.S. government. In
the licensing application process, C.F.R. 960 mandates commercial remote
sensing licensees to provide detailed information, including data safeguard
practices and data sharing compliance.200 The NOAA CRSRA regulations
(C.F.R. 960) provide application filing instructions, and 15 C.F.R. Section
960’s Appendix 1 denotes specific information that must be included in
the license application. The “Ground Segment”201 and “Other
Information”202 sections of Appendix 1 requires licensees to provide the
U.S. Government with detailed system data collection, data processes,
upload and download controls, and other detailed information.
U.S. domestic law provides a regulatory framework that strongly
supports private commercial remote sensing actors and promotes a close
198. REMOTE SENSING POLICY, supra note 39, at 2.
199. The U.S. National Space Policy introduction states: “The utilization of space has
created new markets; helped save lives by warning us of natural disasters, expediting
search and rescue operations, and making recovery efforts faster and more effective; made
agriculture and natural resource management more efficient and sustainable; expanded our
frontiers; and provided global access to advanced medicine, weather forecasting, geospatial
information, financial operations, broadband and other communications, and scores of
other activities worldwide. Space systems allow people and governments around the world
to see with clarity, communicate with certainty, navigate with accuracy, and operate with
assurance. The legacy of success in space and its transformation also presents new
challenges . . . .” NATIONAL SPACE POLICY, supra note 190, at 1.
200. 15 C.F.R. § 960.4 (2018).
201. 15 C.F.R. pt. 960, app. 1 (2018). “Ground Systems” information must include: the
“system data collection and processing capabilities proposed including but not limited to:
Tasking procedures; scheduling plans; data format (downlinked and distributed data);
timeliness of delivery; ground segment information regarding the location of proposed
operations centers and stations, and tasking, telemetry and control; data distribution and
archiving plans; the command (uplink and downlink) and mission data (downlink)
transmission frequencies and system transmission (uplink and downlink) footprint, the
downlink data rate, any plans for communications crosslinks.” Id.
202. Id. The “Other Information” sections of Appendix 1 require licensees to provide
NOAA with, “[t]he applicant’s plans for providing access to or distributing the unenhanced
data generated by the system including: A description of the plan for the sale and
distribution of such data; The method for making the data available to governments whose
territories have been sensed; A description of the plans for making data requested and
purchased by the Department of the Interior available to the National Satellite Land Remote
Sensing Data Archive for inclusion in the basic data set. . .” Id.
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relationship between the U.S. government, U.S. national security interests,
and the commercial sector in space. The policies of strongly supporting
commercial remote sensing activity in space, while maintaining regulatory
oversight over and requiring data sharing from the same commercial
remote sensing actors, foster significant economic growth in the U.S.
commercial remote sensing private sector. The policies enable the U.S.
government to harness and share the benefits of the private sector’s rapid
technical achievements in satellite surveillance capabilities and have
access to the wealth of data afforded from the same surveillance
capabilities, while avoiding potential posse comitatus concerns.
Because commercial remote sensing activity occurs in the “open
skies” of “space,” the regulation of commercial remote sensing occurs
wholly distinct from the U.S. domestic electronic surveillance scheme.
The latter embodies and secures the constitutional right to privacy against
unwarranted or overly intrusive surveillance by the U.S. government. In
their current form, commercial remote sensing regulations fail to consider
or even adhere to U.S. domestic electronic surveillance laws and
constitutional privacy concerns. But we do so in the next section.
VII.

SATELLITES AND SMART DEVICES: U.S. LAW AND
PRIVACY CONCERNS

Above, we discussed the impending rewrite of C.F.R. 960, which
regulates the commercial remote sensing licensing process. The new
C.F.R. 960 regulations are intended to go into effect in December 2019,
although at the time this article goes to the publisher, the text of the
proposed regulations have not been made publicly available. During a
presentation at the National Space Council meeting in Washington, D.C.,
on Oct. 23, 2018, Karen Dunn Kelley, then acting deputy secretary of
commerce, announced that the department had just submitted to the Office
of Management and Budget (OMB) the draft rule revising C.F.R. 960.203
Dunn Kelley stated the new C.F.R. 960 “will revolutionize the way we
regulate the use of cameras in space.” Her comments lauded the
commercial benefits that would flow from the new rule’s unfettering of
regulatory restrictions on what commercial actors can do in space, saying
it would “replace outdated regulation[s] that are slowing down industry
achievements.” The new rule, she said, would create categories that
“exempt certain pre-approved activities” from a lengthy license
application and review process . . .” But Dunn Kelley’s comments made
no mention of privacy or domestic electronic surveillance, and she did not
203. Jeff Foust, Revised Remote Sensing Regulatory Rule Nears Release, SPACENEWS
(Oct. 26, 2018), https://spacenews.com/revised-remote-sensing-regulatory-rule-nearsrelease/.
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address in any way the subject of data aggregation from satellites and
smart devices.204
While commercial remote sensing is heavily regulated by U.S.
domestic law, because commercial remote sensing occurs in “space,” its
regulation has little to no intersection with the long-developed U.S.
scheme of domestic electronic surveillance and associated jurisprudence.
But a review of 15 C.F.R. 960’s Appendix 1, the information required for
licensing requirements, reveals just how much of the data processing and
data use derived from commercial remote sensing takes place using
“Ground Systems.” It is a curious disconnect because commercial remote
sensing companies use satellites to engage in domestic electronic
surveillance and do so through systems, processes, and algorithms
obviously tethered to the planet.
This same hands-off approach to satellite-derived data can be seen in
the collection or use of GPS-based geolocation data, which largely occurs
in a regulatory void. The FCC and the FTC classify geolocation services
as “sensitive information” and urge a heightened need for protection of
privacy, but such protection is not actually mandated by federal statute.205
The FTC recommends “just-in-time” disclosures to consumers, which is
disclosure at the time of collection, to obtain their affirmative consent, and
it also recommends that apps provide consumers with a privacy dashboard
and icons indicating that location information is being collected among
others. If the app collects geolocation data over time, the disclosure should
not give the impression that it is a one-time collection.
To fully appreciate the confounding nature of the disconnect in law
between satellite surveillance and domestic electronic surveillance and
privacy concepts, we will briefly overview U.S. privacy law concepts and
the U.S. domestic electronic surveillance laws and jurisprudence.

204. Id.
205. FED. TRADE COMM’N, MOBILE PRIVACY DISCLOSURES: BUILDING TRUST THROUGH
TRANSPARENCY (Feb. 2010), http://bit.ly/2M55cnN; Alan Murray, FTC Wants to Beef Up
Mobile
Privacy
Disclosures,
WIRED
(Mar.
4,
2013),
https://www.wired.com/insights/2013/03/ftc-wants-to-beef-up-mobile-privacydisclosures/.
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Constitutional Concepts of Privacy206

The word “privacy” does not appear in the United States
Constitution,207 but in their seminal 1890 Harvard Law Review article, The
Right to Privacy, Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis framed our modern
constitutional and common law concepts of privacy.208 In large part due to
Warren and Brandeis’ article, the U.S. Constitution—despite missing the
magic privacy word—is the cornerstone of modern privacy law.209
Common law privacy concepts and the common law right to privacy have
flowed therefrom and, as evidenced by the amount of civil ligation cases
asserting invasion of privacy-based claims, the U.S. common law provides
for a right to privacy.
There are some marked similarities between the issues presented by
the satellites, smart devices, and IoT data aggregation and those that
prompted Warren and Brandeis to write their article in 1890. These issues
are three-fold: (1) legally unfettered gathering of personal data (2) by
private industry for commercial gain (3) enabled through advanced
technologies. In the satellite-smart device-IoT era, these factors combine
to foster invasions of individual privacy on a scale heretofore
unimaginable.
In the 1965 case, Griswold v. Connecticut,210 the U.S. Supreme Court
first recognized a constitutional right to privacy flowing from rights
afforded to citizens in the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth
Amendments to the U.S. Constitution.211 Many of the Court’s decisions
involving the constitutional right to privacy and enhanced forms of
government surveillance involve the Fourth Amendment,212 and its Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence has a long and sometimes convoluted, but
continually evolving, history. A full overview of this history is beyond the
scope of this article. But to understand the disconnect that currently exists
between commercial remote sensing data collection and remote sensing
206. For a more detailed discussion of the history and development of U.S. privacy law,
see generally Anne T. McKenna, Pass Parallel Privacy Standards or Privacy Perishes, 66
RUTGERS L. REV. 1041 (2013).
207. See U.S. CONST.; see also Mark Silverstein, Note, Privacy Rights in State
Constitutions: Models for Illinois?, 1989 U. ILL. L. REV. 215, 218 (1989).
208. See generally Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right of Privacy, 4
HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890).
209. See generally id.
210. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
211. Id. at 483–85.
212. The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides: “The right of
the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable
cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.” U.S. CONST. amend. IV.

MCKENNA-FORMATTED FINAL.DOCX

634

PENN STATE LAW REVIEW

Vol. 123:3

data sharing with the government on the one hand, and U.S. Supreme
Court jurisprudence and the U.S. domestic electronic surveillance scheme
on the other, some background is necessary.213
In the next sections, we address the Court’s Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence, and because commercial remote sensing entities are
engaged in electronic surveillance and location tracking, and the fruits of
that surveillance may be shared with the U.S. government by regulatory
fiat, we also briefly summarize the U.S. domestic electronic surveillance
statutory scheme.
B.

The Fourth Amendment and a Disconnect in Aerial
Surveillance/Location Tracking Jurisprudence

The Fourth Amendment prohibits unreasonable searches and
seizures, but it applies only to government search and seizure.214 It does
not apply to private industry or third-party search and seizure.215 For
decades, the U.S. Supreme Court has considered the constitutionality of
searches conducted with technology that enhances a human’s own ability
to see, follow, feel, hear, or smell. The cornerstone of modern Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence and enhanced surveillance technology centers
around the concept of a reasonable expectation of privacy. In the 1967
Katz v. United States216 case, the Court held that it violated the Fourth
Amendment to attach a listening device to a public telephone booth.
Justice Harlan’s concurrence set the stage for a major development in our
modern-day concept of privacy, which is that one must have a reasonable
expectation of privacy for society and the law to recognize it and protect
it.
In the Court’s evolving Fourth Amendment and constitutional
privacy jurisprudence, willful or knowing disclosure of information took
on greater significance. If you knowingly exposed something to the public
or voluntarily turned information over to someone else (a third party), you
could not claim to have a reasonable expectation of privacy. Voluntarily
turning information over to another formed the basis of the Court’s ThirdParty Doctrine.217

213. We note that satellite surveillance also poses significant First Amendment
concerns, but that is for another article.
214. See United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984).
215. See id. at 117.
216. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967).
217. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 744 (1979). The defendant in Smith had
disclosed the phone numbers he dialed out to the telephone provider. Id. at 745. The Court
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In its framework of jurisprudence addressing enhanced forms of
surveillance, the Court has ruled that the government’s warrantless uses of
wiretaps,218 dog sniffing, 219 thermal imaging,220 attachment and use of a
physical GPS device,221 and obtaining historical cell site location
information (CSLI) for tracking purposes222 are all unlawful violations of
the Fourth Amendment. But the warrantless use of aerial surveillance does
not violate the Fourth Amendment.223
When it comes to applying this framework of rulings to satellite
remote sensing data and its aggregation with smart device data, the
disconnect in the Court’s jurisprudence becomes apparent. One the one
hand, warrantless enhanced aerial surveillance by law enforcement is
lawful, while on the other hand, law enforcement’s warrantless persistent
location tracking by enhanced technologies is unlawful. Specifically, in its
2018 Carpenter decision, the Court ruled that warrantless location
tracking via CSLI was unlawful.224 Carpenter was preceded in 2012 by
the Court’s U.S. v. Jones decision, wherein the Court ruled that the
warrantless attachment and use of a GPS tracking device to a suspect’s car
was unlawful. Justice Sotomayor’s concurrence frames privacy and civil
liberties concerns that apply equally to satellite data as well:
Awareness that the Government may be watching chills associational
and expressive freedoms. And the Government’s unrestrained power
to assemble data that reveal private aspects of identity is susceptible to
abuse. The net result is that GPS monitoring—by making available at
a relatively low cost such a substantial quantum of intimate
information about any person whom the Government, in its unfettered
discretion, chooses to track—may “alter the relationship between
citizen and government in a way that is inimical to democratic
society.”225

held that this voluntary disclosure to the telephone provider was third party disclosure, and
thus the data was no longer afforded Fourth Amendment protection. Id.
218. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 359 (1967).
219. Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 11 (2013).
220. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001).
221. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 412–13 (2012).
222. Carpenter v. United States 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2223 (2018).
223. See Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 239 (1986); see also
California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 215 (1986) (ruling that there was no Fourth
Amendment violation when officers flew over a private residence at 1000 feet and took
photographs after receiving a tip about a marijuana grow operation; Florida v. Riley, 488
U.S. 445, 452 (1989) (ruling that photographs taken from a helicopter at 400 feet over a
private residence did not constitute a search); FISHMAN & MCKENNA, supra note 9, § 30:13.
224. See Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018).
225. Jones, 565 U.S. at 416 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (citing United States v. CuevasPerez, 640 F.3d 272, 285 (7th Cir. 2011) (Flaum, J., concurring)).
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The legal conclusions drawn from these two categories of enhanced
surveillance cases (the aerial surveillance cases and the enhanced,
persistent location tracking cases), while perhaps rational in the historical
context in which each decision was reached, pose a head-on conflict. GPS
satellites combined with smart devices embedded with GPS chips allow
real-time location tracking. The reality is that commercial remote sensing
actors, device manufacturers, and apps aggregate, use, disseminate, and
sell satellite data, GPS chip data, and smart device data and, thus, engage
in persistent location surveillance. Commercial remote sensing activities
and capabilities are evolving so rapidly (consider Raytheon’s SeeMe
satellite) that real-time tracking through images alone is becoming reality.
In the case of commercial remote sensing entities, U.S. government access
to the data is permitted by the licensing regulations.
C.

The U.S. Electronic Surveillance Statutory and Data Scheme

U.S. satellites are governed by space and communications law and
NOAA’s regulatory oversight, rather than domestic electronic surveillance
laws, data laws, and constitutional concepts of privacy. We consider
briefly in this section the U.S domestic electronic surveillance scheme
because the existing U.S. domestic electronic surveillance scheme
embodies the Fourth Amendment and privacy protections developed
through the Court’s jurisprudence, which is discussed in the preceding
section. In the U.S., electronic surveillance and data protections are
regulated at both the federal and state levels. While some states, like
California,226 Illinois,227 and Maryland,228 have enacted laws that afford
greater data privacy protection and stronger protections from electronic
226. See California Online Privacy Protection Act, CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 22575–
79 (West 2019).
The California Online Privacy Protection Act (CalOPPA) applies to commercial website
and mobile app operators that collect personally identifiable information (PII), which is
broadly defined by the statute. CalOPPA requires website operators to conspicuously link
to a Privacy Policy on their website that discloses what type of personal information is
collected through the online service (website and/or mobile app) and with what third parties
the collected PII may be shared. There is no overarching federal law that protects PII.
227. Illinois passed its Biometric Information Privacy Act (BIPA), 740 ILL. COMP.
STAT. 14/1–14/99, in 2008. BIPA affords protection to biometric identifying information
and requires notice and consent for collection of specifically defined biometric identifiers.
See 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 14/15 (West 2019). There is no federal biometric information
privacy law.
228. Maryland’s wiretapping statute, MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 10-402
(West 2019), requires all-party consent to recording of communications whereas federal
law, only requires one party to consent to the recording of a communication. 18 U.S.C. §
2511(2)(c)–(d) (2012 & Supp. 2017).
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surveillance than federal law, in this brief overview, we focus exclusively
on the federal electronic surveillance statutory scheme.229 Because there
currently is no overarching U.S. federal data privacy law, and there is no
specific federal law governing personal data generated by the satellitesmart device information nexus, we have not overviewed the U.S. data law
framework.230 As we note in our recommendation section, however, the
privacy, civil liberty, and national security issues resulting from the
satellite-smart device information nexus (and its data) demand legislative
attention.
The Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA)231 regulates the
interception of wire, oral, and electronic communications by government
and private actors. Through Title III as amended by ECPA, Congress has
sought to safeguard the privacy of wire, oral, and electronic
communications and, in particular, the privacy of innocent persons.232
ECPA forbids the interception of wire, oral or electronic communications
by private persons unless the communication is intercepted by, or with the
consent of, a participant, and significantly restricts the authority of law
enforcement officials to intercept such communications.233
ECPA, passed in 1986, was an effort by Congress to bring advancing
electronic communications platforms and technology, including cellular
phones and location tracking, within the scope of Title III’s protection and
regulation afforded wire and oral communications.234 For instance, ECPA
amended Title III’s definition of wire communication by specifying that
aural transmission constitute wire communication despite the use of radio
waves and not wires, so long as a switching station creates the connection
between the sending and receiving phones.235 As noted in the Senate
Committee report: “[T]his . . . makes clear that cellular communications—
whether they are between two cellular telephones or between a cellular
telephone and a ‘land line’ telephone—are included in the definition of
‘wire communications’ and are covered by the statute.”236
Two federal statutes directly address law enforcement’s use of
cellular devices as mobile tracking devices: 18 U.S.C. § 3117, entitled
229. For an in-depth analysis of electronic surveillance law in the U.S., we direct the
reader to FISHMAN & MCKENNA, supra note 9.
230. That, too, is the subject of another article.
231. See Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100
Stat. 1848 (1986) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.).
232. See Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, §
801(b), 82 Stat. 197, 211 (1968); S. REP. NO. 90-1097 (1968), as reprinted in 1968
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2112, 2177; see also State v. Gilmore, 549 N.W.2d 401, 405 (Wis. 1996)
(citing FISHMAN & MCKENNA, supra note 9).
233. See 18 U.S.C. § 2511.
234. See FISHMAN & MCKENNA, supra note 9, at § 1:15.
235. See Electronic Communications Privacy Act, § 101(a)(6).
236. S.Rep. 99-541, 99th Cong. 2d Sess. reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3565.
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“Mobile tracking devices,”237 which regulates the use of tracking devices
that move across state lines; and 47 U.S.C. § 1002, part of the
Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act (CALEA),238
which we discuss briefly below. In the Mobile Tracking Devices statute,
ECPA broadly defines “tracking device” to mean “an electronic or
mechanical device which permits the tracking of the movement of a person
or thing.”239
In application of these statutes to cell phones tracking, we also briefly
mention ECPA’s Pen Register Trap and Trace Statute (the “Pen/Trap
Statute”),240 which regulates the use of pen/trap devices, and the Stored
Communications Act (SCA).241 The Pen/Trap Statute governs real-time
interception of “the numbers dialed or otherwise transmitted on the
telephone line to which such device is attached.”242 To date, a Rule 41
warrant based upon probable cause has been necessary to authorize and
install a mobile tracking device.243 The Pen/Trap Statute only requires a
certification that the pen/trap device may obtain information relevant to an
ongoing investigation.244 It specifically provides that:
a government agency authorized to install and use a pen register or trap
and trace device under this chapter . . . shall use technology reasonably
available to it that restricts the recording or decoding of electronic or
other impulses to the dialing, routing, addressing, and signaling
information utilized in the processing and transmitting of wire or
electronic communications so as not to include the contents of any wire
or electronic communications.245

237. See 18 U.S.C. § 3117 (2012 & Supp. 2017).
238. See Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No.
103-414, 108 Stat. 4279 (1994) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 and 47
U.S.C.).
239. 18 U.S.C. § 3117(b).
240. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3121 to 3127.
241. 18 U.S.C. § 2703.
242. The Pen/Trap Statute, enacted as part of ECPA, governs real-time interception of
“dialing, routing, addressing, or signaling information transmitted by an instrument or
facility from which a wire or electronic communication is transmitted, provided, however,
that such information shall not include the contents of any communication.” Electronic
Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508, § 3126(3), 100 Stat. 1848, 1871
(1986) (amended 2001). The standard is that of a rubber stamp. See CDT’s Analysis of S.
2092: Amending the Pen Register and Trap and Trace Statute in Response to Recent
Internet Denial of Service Attacks and to Establish Meaningful Privacy Protections, CTR.
FOR
DEMOCRACY
&
TECH.
(Apr.
4,
2000),
https://www.cdt.org/files/security/000404amending.shtml.
243. See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 405 (2012).
244. 18 U.S.C. § 3122(b)(2) (2012 & Supp. 2017).
245. 18 U.S.C. § 3121(c) (2012 & Supp. 2017).
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Information that communication service providers may produce to
law enforcement pursuant to the Pen/Trap Statute is specifically limited
by CALEA.246 CALEA forbids the provider from producing “any
information that may disclose the physical location of the subscriber”
when the provider is producing call identifying information pursuant to
the Pen/Trap statute.247
ECPA’s Stored Communications Act (SCA), found at 18 U.S.C. §§
2701 to 2712, authorizes government access to stored communications in
the hands of third-party providers.248 The SCA categorizes different types
of stored communications (information) and what the government must do
to obtain access to those different types of information.249 The protection
afforded by the SCA to these different types of information is based upon
the type of stored information sought, i.e. is it addressing or dialing
information (which is afforded the least protection), or is it “content”
information (which is afforded the greatest protection from
surveillance).250
This brief overview of certain elements of our complex federal
electronic surveillance legislative scheme is to demonstrate that Congress
intended, through these laws, to protect U.S. citizens’ electronic
communications, cellular communications, and location information.
However, this complex scheme typically does not apply to private
industry’s tracking of and data aggregation from individuals via the
satellite-smart device information nexus. We discuss that information
nexus in more detail in our next section.
D.

Privacy and Civil Liberty Concerns

Satellite-based information systems and sensor-based information
systems have merged into an information nexus. The satellite-smart device
information nexus is best understood as a chain of information collection
technologies,251 laws and regulations,252 and agreements253 between
multiple actors. As noted above, the U.S. government provides public
access to GPS satellites. Phone manufacturers are in essence required to
246. See Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No.
103-414, 108 Stat. 4279 (1994) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 and 47
U.S.C.).
247. 47 U.S.C. § 1002(a)(2)(B) (2012 & Supp. 2017) (emphasis added).
248. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701–12 (2012 & Supp. 2017).
249. See id.
250. See id.
251. See supra Parts III (describing satellite technology), IV (describing smart device
technology).
252. See supra Parts VI (describing satellite laws and regulations), VII (describing
smart device laws and regulations).
253. See, e.g., APPLE, supra note 160.

MCKENNA-FORMATTED FINAL.DOCX

640

PENN STATE LAW REVIEW

Vol. 123:3

equip phones with a GPS receiver.254 Manufacturers increasingly equip
devices with MEMS sensors. Devices increasingly use third-party
applications. Third-party applications use GPS receivers and MEMS
sensors both for the function and as a source of revenue.255
Unfortunately, these actors are often concerned with only one chain
of the information nexus at a time. For example, application developers
who create a GPS application view the nexus through that interaction and
fail to consider the relationship between the GPS application and the
device’s MEMS sensors. Manufacturers who equip their MEMS sensors
similarly view the nexus through that interaction and fail to consider the
relationship between the sensors and the GPS recievers.256
The result: data aggregation from commercial remote sensing
activities combined with smart devices and IoT realities have created a
dramatically altered privacy landscape with significant national security
and civil liberties impacts. While scholars agree that privacy norms
continue to shift with technological advances and the proliferation of
social media sites and other information sharing platforms,257 the public
and legislators appear unaware of both the vast surveillance capabilities of
commerical remote sensing activities and, when combined with data
aggregated via smart device sensors, the current state of complete
surveillance of all persons’ locations, physical status, and their proximity
and relationship to other persons at all times. The continued disconnect
between the regulation of commercial remote sensing activities, the
regulation of data aggregation from smart device sensors and IoT devices,
and current U.S. electronic surveillance law and U.S. Supreme Court
decisions leads to confusion, lack of citizen awareness, and enables
situations like the Strava case study.
VIII.

SATELLITE DATA AND SMART DEVICES: NATIONAL
SECURITY CONCERNS

In the wake of the Strava heatmap incident, many wondered how the
U.S. Department of Defense was so blindsided? How did it fail to see the
254. See 10 U.S.C. § 2281(b) (2012 & Supp. 2017).
255. Compare Robb, supra note 2 (using the smart device’s GPS receiver), with
Balyberdin, supra note 144 (using the smart device’s MEMS sensors).
256. Compare Sarah Williams, More than Data: Working With Big Data for Civics, 11
I/S: J. L. & POL’Y 181, 192–93, 196 (2015) (failing to note the legal implications of data
collection), with Cuellar, supra note 150, at 30 (discussing the impact of AI on markets,
politics, institutions, and societal norms, as well as the need to structure laws in recognition
of the growth and impact of AI).
257. Basil A. DiSipio, Global Positioning Systems and Social Media—Anathemas to
Privacy, DEF. COUNSEL J., Oct. 2017, at 1, 1–5.
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impact that the aggregation of satellite data would have on impact national
security? In our view, there are two main reasons the U.S. government
failed to recognize or appreciate the scope of the threat. First, the U.S.
military was focused on different types of threats to satellites—threats
from malicious actors, threats of physical destruction, and threats from
cyber operations. The U.S. military did not anticipate or fully appreciate
the impact that non-malicious aggregation of publicly-available satellite
data could have on national security. Second, a cumbersome legal regime
coupled with the U.S. policy promoting private sector ownership of remote
sensing satellites impeded U.S. national defense entities from identifying
the harmful impact of GPS and smart device data. This is not a new
problem. The U.S. government has struggled for years to achieve the
appropriate balance between national security concerns and commercial
interests in exploring and using space. Although not new, the struggle is
more urgent with the coming of 5G networks and increasing number of
satellites with remote sensing capabilities.
This section describes and analyzes the specific threats posed by the
aggregation of commercial satellite data to U.S. national security. It
examines why the U.S. government was surprised by the Strava heatmap
incident and failed to anticipate similar threats. It next considers the legal
authorities that permit the U.S. government to restrict the collection, use,
and dissemination of remote sensing data in the interest of national
security, describes the current regime’s shortcomings and previews
developments in the law. Finally, it explains why the Strava incident was
not a one-time concern, but reflective of a growing and persistent
challenge.
The U.S. civilian economy is “heavily dependent” on satellites for a
variety of functions.258 Satellite-provided services are so “ubiquitous” that
we neither notice their origin,259 nor do we fully appreciate the breadth and
depth of our reliance on the availability, integrity, and reliability of
satellite-provided data and services.260 Indeed, at least one scholar has
referred to satellites as the “Achilles heel “ of the U.S. civilian economy,
noting that any disruption to the availability, integrity, and reliability of
satellites will have significant—and likely adverse—impacts.261
258. See Francis Grimal & Jae Sundaram, The Incremental Militarization of Outer
Space: A Threshold Analysis, 17 CHINESE INT’L L.J. 45, 54 (2018).
259. See David A. Koplow, The Fault is Not in Our Stars: Avoiding An Arms Race in
Outer Space, 59 HARV. INT’L L.J. 331, 332 (2018).
260. Id. at 331–32. As Professor Kolpow writes, “[We are] passively unaware of how
thoroughly our daily activities, and our responses to military crises, have become reliant
upon a secure, predictable regime of outer space . . . .” Id. at 332.
261. See id. at 331 – 37 (“[S]atellites may now be the Achilles heel of the American
civilian economy and its mighty military apparatus.”); Michael Nayak, CubeSat Proximity
Operations: The Natural Evolution of Defensive Space Control into a Deterrence
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Like the U.S. civilian economy, the U.S. military is dependent on
satellites. It depends on satellite-generated data for communications,
surveillance, early warning systems, navigation, signals intelligence, and
meteorology.262 Given this dependence, how did the U.S. military not
anticipate the threat presented by a company like Strava that was
collecting, aggregating and sharing data from remote sensing satellites?
A.

The Strava Heatmap: Understanding the National Security
Impacts from the Aggregation of Remote Sensing Data and
Smart Devices

To appreciate the scope of the data aggregation threat, it is helpful to
be specific about the information the Strava heatmap revealed. On January
27, 2018, Nathan Ruser’s tweet stated, “If soldiers use the app like normal
people do, by turning it on tracking when they go to do exercise, it could
be especially dangerous.”263 It was “dangerous” for a number of reasons.
However, from a national security perspective, the Strava heatmap created
four distinct types of security risk.
First, the heatmap identified the boundaries of previously unknown
or secret U.S. military bases around the world.264 To put it bluntly, as one
headline did: “Fitness app Strava lights up staff at military bases.”265
Second, the aggregation of users’ GPS data into a global heatmap revealed
patrol routes, as well as military supply and transportation routes and may
have identified other previously unknown facilities as a user moved from
a known military base to other military facilities.266 “[T]he bigger worry
from an operations security standpoint [is] how Strava’s activity data
could be used to identify interesting individuals, and track them to other
Initiative, SPACE REV. (Jan. 18, 2016), http://www.thespacereview.com/article/2902/1
(“Foreign policy analysts have not missed this Achilles heel either.”).
262. See Grimal & Sundar, supra note 258, at 54.
263. Nathan Ruser (@Nrg8000), TWITTER (Jan. 27, 2018, 10:56 AM),
https://twitter.com/Nrg8000/status/957326421684207616.
264. See Fitness app Strava lights up staff at military bases, BBC NEWS (Jan. 29, 2018),
https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-42853072 (appearing to show the structure of
foreign military bases in countries including Syria and Afghanistan as soldiers move
around them); see also Jeremy Hsu, The Strava Heat Map and the End of Secrets, WIRED
(Jan. 29, 2018, 7:14 PM), https://www.wired.com/story/strava-heat-map-military-basesfitness-trackers-privacy/.
265. See BBC NEWS, supra note 264; see also Liz Sly et al., U.S. military reviewing its
rules after fitness trackers exposed sensitive data, WASH. POST (Jan. 29, 2018),
https://wapo.st/2w5OWrz.
266. See Hsu, supra note 264 (“You could for example identify somebody who works
at a known secret facility and then track his movements to other facilities through which
he may rotate.”).

2019

THE ROLE OF SATELLITES AND SMART DEVICES

643

sensitive or secretive locations.”267 Third, depending on how a user set
their privacy settings in the app, the interactive capability of the map
revealed the identities and locations of specific individuals.268 “Once you
can identify individuals the data becomes a lot more valuable,” said Tobias
Schneider, a Berlin-based security analyst.269 One Strava user
demonstrated how to use the heatmap and Google to identify by name a
U.S. Army major and his running route at a base in Afghanistan.270
Fourth, and finally, this is not a problem specific to military
personnel. The heatmap also revealed information about humanitarian and
aid workers and their routes and operations.271 In 2018, a former
peacekeeper noted that he was able to use the map to pinpoint the jogging
route he used when he served with U.N. peacekeepers in South Sudan.272
He used similar sites to identify the names and daily routines of eight
foreigners working for aid agencies and the United Nations in the Somali
capital Mogadishu, noting that the “focus of this story has been soldiers
and spies, but we are also talking about humanitarian workers. If you look
at what we saw in Mogadishu and you are al-Shabab, you get a pretty good
idea of who the foreigners are and where they are working.”273
To be clear, Strava violated no laws in creating the global heatmap or
in making it publicly available. Likewise, the Strava users who failed to
use the most rigorous privacy settings when setting up the app did nothing
illegal, although many have since changed those settings. Rather, the
consequences of aggregating publicly available GPS data, gathered from
users of wearable connected devices, came as an unwelcome surprise to
many. So how did the U.S. military, which is heavily dependent on and
invested in the use of remote sensing satellite data, fail to appreciate this
surprise?

267. Id. (noting that researcher and activist Paul Dietrich claimed to use public data
scraped from Strava’s website to track a French soldier from overseas deployment back to
France).
268. See Sly et al., supra note 257. To understand why a benign business decision by a
private company had such an adverse impact on national security, it is important to
appreciate the individualized nature of the data revealed. Journalists, experts and others
found ways to use the publicly available Strava data to identify individual users of the
tracking service by name, along with the jogging routes they use in war zones such as Iraq
and Afghanistan. Id.
269. Id. (describing a researcher who claims to have identified the names of 573 people
who jog every morning around the parking lot of the headquarters of British intelligence,
making it highly likely they work for the agency).
270. Id.
271. Id.
272. Id.
273. Id.
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A Data Surprise: Why the U.S. Missed the Data Aggregation
Threat
1.

Focusing on Other Threats to Satellites

First, the U.S. military may have missed the aggregation threat
because it was focused on threats to satellites of a different nature and type.
The military was focused on threats from malicious actors, either nation
states or organized terrorist groups. It was focused on threats of physical
destruction to its own satellites. It was focused on threats of cyber
operations against its military and commercially-owned satellites.
Most government policy statements regarding national security
threats to satellites focus on malicious actors, either state actors or
organized terrorist groups. Two recent examples illustrate this perspective.
The National Air and Space Intelligence Center published Competing in
Space in December 2018, in which it warned of the increasing capabilities
of Russia and China in operating remote sensing satellites to support their
military missions.274 The report stated that “China and Russia have the
largest remote sensing satellite fleets outside the U.S.”275 The report
includes graphics on the growing space launch capabilities of Russia and
China276 and cites concerns about how the increasing use of dual-use
technologies will “challenge U.S. ability to provide advanced warning of
nefarious intentions or discern between peaceful and potential hostile
activity.”277
Similarly, the U.S. military has been focused on threats of physical
destruction to its own satellites and to other space objects. Such threats
include satellite collisions, both accidental and intentional,278 as well as
the debris fields created by such collisions. Recent examples of physical
threats include China’s 2007 use of a ground-based anti-satellite missile

274. See generally NAT’L AIR & SPACE INTEL. CTR., COMPETING IN SPACE 6 (Dec.
2018),
http://www.airforcemag.com/DRArchive/Documents/Competing%20in%20Space.pdf.
275. Id. at 6.
276. Id. at 12–13.
277. Id. at 25; see also DAVID LIVINGSTONE & PATRICIA LEWIS, CHATHAM HOUSE,
SPACE, THE FINAL FRONTIER FOR CYBERSECURITY?, at 9 (Sept. 2016),
https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/publications/research/2016-09-22space-final-frontier-cybersecurity-livingstone-lewis.pdf (listing only threats from
malicious actors).
278. See Brian D. Green, Space Situational Awareness Data Sharing: Safety Tool or
Security Threat?, 75 A.F. L. REV. 39, 52–62 (2016).
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to destroy one of its defunct weather satellites, Fengyun 1C.279 And in
2013, China launched another missile with the potential to strike targets in
the geostationary orbit region.280 More recent efforts by China and Russia
include efforts to develop anti-satellite missiles and counter-space
directed-energy weapons and to establish networks of ground-based
sensors to monitor and target the commercial and military satellites of
other nations.281
Finally, the U.S. military has been focused on the growing number
and variety of cyber threats to satellite and space systems. These threats
are not insignificant, and include threats to the space, user, link and ground
segments of satellite systems.282 Military planners and strategists worry
about the real threat of hacking communications or navigational networks,
targeting or hijacking control systems or specific electronics for missions,
shutting down satellites, altering their orbits, “grilling” their solar cells
through deliberate exposure to damaging radiation, redirecting or
diverting the data the satellite transmits to someone other than its
owner, operation or intended audience. 283 The means are not unique to
satellites and include hacking, command intrusion, payload control, denial
of service, introducing malware to cause an abnormality in operations,284
spoofing, blinding, uplink and downlink jamming.285 In addition, older
satellites, occasionally referred to as “space junk,” are particularly
vulnerable to cyber operations.286
279. See William J. Broad & David E. Sanger, China Tests Anti-Satellite Weapon,
Unnerving U.S., N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 18, 2007), https://www.nytimes.com/2007/01/18/world
/asia/18cnd-china.html); see also Chinese Anti-satellite Test Creates Most Severe Orbital
Debris Cloud in History, ORBITAL DEBRIS Q. NEWS, Apr. 2007, at 2, 2–3 (Nat’l Aeronautics
& Space Admin., Houston, Tex.), https://orbitaldebris.jsc.nasa.gov/quarterlynews/pdfs/odqnv11i2.pdf.
280. See Bill Gertz, China Conducts Test of New Anti-Satellite Missile, WASH. FREE
BEACON (May 14, 2013, 1:46 PM), https://freebeacon.com/national-security/chinaconducts-test-of-new-anti-satellite-missile/.
281. See COMPETING IN SPACE, supra note 274, at 20–21.
282. Id. at 18–19.
283. See Patricia Lewis & David Livingstone, The cyber threat in outer space, BULL.
ATOMIC SCIENTISTS (Nov. 21, 2016), https://thebulletin.org/2016/11/the-cyber-threat-inouter-space/; see also Green, supra note 278, at 25–26. Cyber warfare experts like Gen.
John Hyten, commander of U.S. Strategic Command, have warned that China and
Russia are developing “counter space capabilities” such as electronic jammers and
advanced signal scramblers specifically to target U.S. military satellites. See Sandra
Erwin, Senior military official: Space secrets becoming harder to keep, SPACENEWS
(Jan. 30, 2018), https://spacenews.com/senior-military-official-space-secretsbecoming-harder-to-keep/.
284. See Green, supra note 278, at 26.
285. See COMPETING IN SPACE, supra note 274, at 19.
286. See Jan Kallberg, Why older satellites present a cyber risk, FIFTH DOMAIN (Dec.
28,
2018),
https://www.fifthdomain.com/opinion/2018/12/28/why-older-satellitespresent-a-cyber-risk/ (describing the varied ways that malicious actors could take
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In sum, the U.S. military has been focused, arguably appropriately
so, on protecting its own satellites from physical or cyber attack by
malicious actors. These threats should be considered and addressed by the
U.S. military. However, the U.S. military needs to expand its focus to
consider a new category of threats, those posed by the non-malicious
aggregation of commercially-available satellite data.
2.

A Disjointed and Cumbersome Regulatory Regime

A second reason the U.S. military failed to fully anticipate the threat
posed by the aggregation of publicly available GPS data is due to the lack
of a coherent legal regime on how to balance commercial interests and
national security concerns in space. This is not a new problem. Since the
initiation of space activities, the U.S. has attempted through legislation,
regulation, and policy to balance national security concerns while
promoting the peaceful commercial and research uses of outer space. The
international community has attempted to strike a similar balance.
Any discussion of the international legal regime governing satellites
will highlight five key authorities.287 Three of these authorities form the
governing treaty law: the 1967 Treaty on Principles Governing the
Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space (the “Outer
Space Treaty”),288 the 1972 Convention on International Liability for
Damage Caused by Space Objects (the “Liability Convention”),289 and the
1975 Convention on Registration of Objects launched into Outer Space
(the “Registration Convention”).290 Taken together, these three authorities
attempt to balance the legitimate national security interests of individual
nation states with the idea that “exploration and use of outer space . . . be
carried out for the benefit and interests of all countries . . . and shall be the

advantage of older satellites relying on outdated hardware and software – occasionally
from 1980s).
287. For an overview of the international laws governing remote sensing satellites, see
supra Section VI.A. See also Hoversten, supra note 176, at 260–265.
288. Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use
of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies art. 1, Jan. 27, 1967, 18.3
U.S.T. 2410, 610 U.N.T.S. 205 [hereinafter Outer Space Treaty].
289. Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects, Mar.
29, 1972, 24 U.S.T. 2389, 961 U.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter Liability Convention] (requiring
signatory states to accept absolute liability for damages caused by the state’s satellites to
Earth and other satellites).
290. Convention on the Regulation of Objects Launched into Outer Space, Jan. 14,
1975, 29 U.S.T. 695, 1023 U.N.T.S. 15 [hereinafter Registration Convention] (requiring
signatory states to maintain a national registry of objects it launches into space and report
such information to the United Nations).
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province of all mankind.”291 The fourth authority, the 1987 Principles
Relating to Remote Sensing of the Earth from Outer Space (the “UN
Remote Sensing Principles”),292 captured the “open skies” concept, which
permits states to freely sense and distribute data from outer space without
the consent of the sensed state.293 A final authority is Article 34 of the ITU
Constitution,294 which gives states the right to cut off private
telecommunications activities which threaten national security.295
The U.S. domestic legal regime attempts this same balancing act with
regard to the use of remote sensing satellites. The first congressional
finding in the Land Remote Sensing Policy Act of 1992 provided that
“[t]he continuous collection and utilization of land remote sensing data
from space are of major benefit in studying and understanding human
impacts on the global environment, in managing the Earth’s natural
resources, in carrying out national security functions, and in planning and
conducting many other activities of scientific, economic, and social
importance.”296 Likewise, the regulations governing the licensing of
private remote sensing systems identify the following as a key purpose: to
“[a]dvance and protect U.S. national security and foreign policy interests
by maintaining U.S. leadership in remote sensing space activities, and by
sustaining and enhancing the U.S. remote sensing industry.”297 This trend
continues in the recently proposed, but not enacted, American Space
Commerce Free Enterprise Act of 2017, which states: “It is the policy of
the United States that, to the maximum extent practicable, the Federal
Government shall take steps to protect the national security interests of the
United States that do not involve regulating or limiting the freedoms of
United States nongovernmental entities to explore and use space.”298 And
finally, the recent Space Policy Directive-2, issued by President Donald
291. See Outer Space Treaty, supra note 288; see also Hoversten, supra note 176, at
261 (explaining how the Outer Space Treaty lays the foundation for principles of “common
interest,” “freedom” and non-appropriation” in space).
292. G.A. Res. 41/65, Principles Relating to Remote Sensing of the Earth From Space
(Dec. 3, 1986)[hereinafter UN Remote Sensing Principles].
293. See id. annex, at 2; see also Hoversten, supra note 176, at 260–265.
294. INT’L TELECOMM. UNION CONST. art. 34
295. See id. (“Member States also reserve the right to cut off, in accordance with their
national law, any other private telecommunications which may appear dangerous to the
security of the State or contrary to its laws, to public order or to decency.”).
296. Land Remote Sensing Policy Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-555, § 2(1), 106 Stat.
4163, 4163 (1992) (codified as amended at 51 U.S.C. ch. 601).
297. See 15 C.F.R. § 960.1 (2018).
298. See American Space Commerce Free Enterprise Act of 2017, H.R. 2809, 115th
Cong. § 4(b) (2017). The bill passed out of the House of Representatives, and was referred
to the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation of the U.S. Senate in April
2018. See Actions Overview H.R. 2809—115th Congress (2017-2018), CONGRESS.GOV,
https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/house-bill/2809/actions (last visited June
20, 2019).
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Trump in May 2018, provides: “It is therefore important that regulations
adopted and enforced by the executive branch promote economic growth;
minimize uncertainty for taxpayers, investors, and private industry; protect
national security, public-safety, and foreign policy interests; and
encourage American leadership in space commerce.”299
To protect the national security side of this scale, the U.S.
government relies on a number of specific legal and policy authorities to
restrict space activities that pose a threat to national security. These
authorities include: the Remote Land Sensing Policy Act of 1992300 and
subsequent amendments, codified at 51 U.S.C. Chapter 601; the
implementing regulations at 15 C.F.R. Part 960; U.S. Commercial Remote
Sensing Policy (dated April 25, 2003);301 the National Space Policy of the
United States (dated June 2010),302 the U.S. Commercial Space Launch
Competitiveness Act of 2015,303 which amended Title II of the Remote
Land Sensing Policy Act; the Memorandum of Understanding Among the
Departments of Commerce, State, Defense, and Interior, and the Office of
the Director of National Intelligence, Concerning the Licensing and
Operations of Private Remote Sensing Satellite Systems (dated April 25,
2017);304 and Space Policy Directive-2 on “Streamlining Regulations on
Commercial Use of Space” (dated May 24, 2018).305
While a full review of these authorities is beyond the scope of this
article, we will focus on a few provisions with significant national security
bite. As noted in Section VI supra, U.S. law requires owners and operators
of private remote sensing space systems, including satellites, to secure a
license from the U.S. Department of Commerce. The licensing authority
299. Space Policy Directive-2: Streamlining Regulations on Commercial Use of Space,
83 Fed. Reg. 24901, 24901 (May 30, 2018) [hereinafter Space Policy Directive-2]
300. Land Remote Sensing Policy Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-555, 106 Stat. 4163
(1992).
301. REMOTE SENSING POLICY, supra note 39. The 2003 policy superseded Presidential
Decision Directive 23, U.S. Policy on Foreign Access to Remote Sensing Space
Capabilities (March 9, 1994), and urged the U.S. government to develop strong
relationships with private sector entities in the remote sensing industry while ensuring
appropriate protection of national security and foreign policy initiatives. Id.
302. NATIONAL SPACE POLICY, supra note 190.
303. U.S. Commercial Space Launch Competitiveness Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 11490, 129 Stat. 704 (2015).
304. Memorandum of Understanding Among the Departments of Commerce, State,
Defense, and Interior, and the Office of the Deflector of National Intelligence, Concerning
the Licensing and Operations of Private Remote Sensing Satellite Systems (April 25,
2017), https://bit.ly/30b3bsQ [hereinafter Remote Sensing MOU]. The 2017 MOU seems
to replace an earlier MOU among these departments, dated February 2, 2000, although it
does not expressly say so. See 15 C.F.R. pt. 960, app. 2 (2018).
305. Space Policy Directive-2, supra note 299.

2019

THE ROLE OF SATELLITES AND SMART DEVICES

649

is executed by NOAA’s Commercial Remote Sensing Regulatory Affairs
Office. Thus, the first national security checkpoint for remote sensing
satellites comes in the license application process. The Department of
Commerce’s general licensing authority requires consultation with other
appropriate U.S. government agencies, including the Department of the
Defense when the license application is first submitted to ensure
consideration of national security concerns. “No license shall be granted
by the Secretary unless the Secretary determines in writing that the
applicant will comply with . . . any . . . national security concerns of the
United States.”306 The nuts and bolts of the interagency review process that
identifies, considers and assesses the national security interest is provided
in the aforementioned Memorandum of Understanding.307
A second national security lever occurs when NOAA sets the initial
conditions for the license. The regulations require that the licensee
“operate its system in a manner that preserves the national security” and
notes that the government may place limitations on the satellite’s
operational performance, “including, but not limited to, limitations on data
collection and dissemination.” 308 In addition, the regulations require the
licensee to maintain operational control of the satellite from a location
within the U.S. with command override ability.309
A third national security check can occur either at the outset or during
the license term. As part of the monitoring and compliance process, or due
to changing national security circumstances, the government may require
the licensee ”to limit data collection and/or distribution by the system as
determined to be necessary to meet significant national security or
significant foreign policy concerns.”310 In addition, the government may,
when “necessary to meet significant national security” interests, require
the licensee to provide “unenhanced restricted images on a commercial
basis exclusively to the U.S. Government.”311

306. 51 U.S.C. § 60121(b)(1) (2012 & Supp. 2017); see also 15 C.F.R. § 960.6(f)
(2018) (“[n]o license shall be granted by the Secretary unless the Secretary determines, in
writing, . . . that the granting of such license and the operation of the license and system by
the licensee would be consistent with the national security interest . . . of the United
States.”).
307. Remote Sensing MOU, supra note 299.
308. 15 C.F.R § 960.11(b)(1) (2018); see also 51 U.S.C. §§ 60122(b)(1), 60147(a)
(2012 & Supp. 2017) (“The Secretary and the Landsat Program Management shall consult
with the Secretary of Defense on all matters under this Act affecting national security. The
Secretary of Defense shall be responsible for determining those conditions, consistent with
this Act, necessary to meet national security concerns of the United States and for notifying
the Secretary and the Landsat Program Management promptly of such conditions.”).
309. 15 C.F.R. § 960.11(b)(2).
310. Id. § 960.11(b)(4).
311. Id.

MCKENNA-FORMATTED FINAL.DOCX

650

PENN STATE LAW REVIEW

Vol. 123:3

A fourth and final national security touchpoint occurs in the reporting
requirement. An important but often overlooked provision requires annual
reports to Congress on various aspects of the licensing and enforcement
provisions.312 This reporting provision requires the Secretary of
Commerce to submit an annual report to the Committee on Commerce,
Science, and Transportation of the U.S. Senate and the Committee on
Science, Space, and Technology of the U.S. House of Representatives.313
Among other items, the annual report must include a list of all applications
for remote sensing licenses received in the previous calendar year, a list of
all applications that resulted in a license for a remote sensing space system,
and a list of all applications denied, as well as an explanation of why each
application was denied, including any information relevant to the
interagency adjudication process.314
It is worth noting that the authorities listed above do not identify a
specific type of national security threat, nor do they describe the scale,
scope, or nature of the national security interest. Taken together, however,
they provide a mechanism for the Department of Defense, and other
national security entities, to identify and respond to national security
concerns relating to the collection, use, access, and dissemination of
imagery gathered by remote sensing satellites. More specifically, these
provisions—in conjunction with the implementing regulations and
executive branch policy statements315—form the legal basis for the
national security-related restrictions that the U.S. government places on
privately-operated remote sensing satellites. These restrictions generally
fall into four categories: (1) limitations on the operational performance of
the satellite;316 (2) requirements for reporting, monitoring, and
compliance;317 (3) limitations on foreign involvement in the U.S. remote
sensing and satellite industry;318 and (4) limitations on data collection and/
312. See 51 U.S.C. § 60126 (2012 & Supp. 2017).
313. Id. § 60126(a).
314. Id.
315. 15 C.F.R. pt. 960, app. 2 (2018) (“In consultation with affected agencies,
limitations on commercial remote sensing systems will be imposed by the Secretary of
Commerce when necessary to meet international obligations and national security and
foreign policy concerns and will be in accord with the determinations of the Secretary of
Defense and the Secretary of State and with applicable law”).
316. 15 C.F.R. § 960.11(b)(1) (2018).
317. See, e.g., 15 C.F.R. § 960.11(b)(3) (detailing a licensee’s reporting requirements).
318. See 15 C.F.R. § 960.8 (2018); see also 10 U.S.C. § 2274(a) (2012 & Supp. 2017).
The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 amended 10 U.S.C. §
2274(a) by specifying when the Secretary of Defense can share SSA data, who can DOD
share that data with, who must pay, and issues of civil and criminal immunity. See The
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-844, 123 Stat.
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or dissemination, often referred to as “shutter control.”319 This allows the
U.S. government to prohibit images of a certain resolution, to prohibit
imaging over a particular geographic location, and to restrict the clarity of
the commercially available images when publicly released.320
C.

The Limits of the Current Regulations and New
Developments

Despite the seemingly broad reach of the national security restrictions
on the collection and dissemination of satellite data, as described above,
in practice they have limited application. The limits fall into three
categories. First, a jurisdictional limit: the national security protections
limit only U.S. companies subject to U.S. laws and regulations. While the
regulations include restraints on foreign investment in U.S. satellite and
remote sensing companies, there is nothing to prevent a foreign company
from collecting, using, and sharing with others the data that the U.S.
government identified as impacting national security interests.321 Indeed,
some have argued that the U.S. regulatory scheme actually accelerated the
growth of satellite and remote sensing industries abroad. According to
James Vedda, a senior policy analyst at Aerospace Corporation, “[a]ll
you’ve really done is drive business to those foreign companies.”322 The
second category relates to criticisms of the inter-agency process for
2190. The Secretary of Defense has since delegated this authority to the Commander of the
U.S. Strategic Command. See Green, supra note 278, at 63–64.
319. For an overview of these protections, see Hoversten, supra note 176, at 270–79.
See also RICK HEIDNER, SHUTTER CONTROL: AN APPROACH TO REGULATION IMAGERY FROM
PRIVATELY OPERATED RS SATELLITES (May 15, 2014), https://bit.ly/2yNcRzc; Sarah
Scoles, How The Government Controls Sensitive Satellite Data, WIRED (Feb. 8, 2018),
https://bit.ly/2PYekZG; Hamed Aleaziz, Why Google Earth Can’t Show You Israel,
MOTHER JONES (June 10, 2011), https://bit.ly/2YkobvM. A notable example of geographic
imaging restrictions occurred in 1997, when “Congress passed the annual National Defense
Authorization Act, one section of which was titled, ‘Prohibition on collection and release
of detailed satellite imagery relating to Israel.’ The amendment, known as the KylBingaman Amendment, permitted a U.S. government agency, NOAA’s Commercial
Remote Sensing Regulatory Affairs, to regulate the dissemination of zoomed-in images of
Israel.” Aleaziz, supra (emphasis omitted).
320. See 51 U.S.C. § 60121(b)(1) (2012 & Supp. 2017); see also 15 C.F.R. § 960.6(f)
(2018). See also Scoles, supra note 319; National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 1997, Pub. L. No. 104-201, § 1064, 110 Stat. 2422, 2653 (1996) (Kyl-Bingaman
Amendment). According to an October 2018 meeting of ACCRES, the U.S. currently
limits imagery over Israel to “coarser than 2 meters GSD.” See Samira Patel, NOAA’s
Commercial Remote Sensing Regulatory Affairs, NAT’L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN.
9 (Oct. 2018), https://bit.ly/2Lz7MC6 (slide deck).
321. COMPETING IN SPACE, supra note 274, at 7.
322. See Scoles, supra note 319; see also COMPETING IN SPACE, supra note 274, at 6.
The development of remote sensing satellite industry in other countries and the
developments in imagery has reduced the ability of countries to perform sensitive military
operations undetected.
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seeking input and approving licenses. Complaints abound about long
license processing times and a lack of transparency as to the reasons for
license denials or limitations on data collection and dissemination. Similar
complaints point to ineffective monitoring and compliance reports. A third
limit is the outdated nature of the licensing scheme that is tasked with
regulating an industry at the forefront of technological development and
advancement. The current regulations were last updated in 2006, which
was more than a decade ago and prior to the introduction of Apple’s first
iPhone.
Given these limits, it should come as no surprise that efforts at reform
are coming from all quarters. In 2015, Congress passed the U.S.
Commercial Space Launch Competitiveness Act of 2015 with the
objective of facilitating a pro-growth environment for the development of
a commercial space industry by encouraging private sector investment and
creating more stable and predictable regulatory conditions.323 Recent
legislative efforts have echoed this focus on encouraging private
investment and improving the regulatory landscape, and have included the
proposed American Space Commerce Free Enterprise Act of 2017324 and
Space Frontier Act of 2019.325 Both included provisions aimed at
shortening the duration of the license application process and providing
greater clarity to license applicants.326
Indeed, the executive branch has been active as well. In May 2018,
President Trump issued Space Policy Directive-2, titled “Streamlining
Regulations on Commercial Use of Space.”327 Section 3 of the directive
tasks the Secretary of Commerce with reviewing—and possibly revising
or rescinding—the licensing regime for commercial remote sensing
systems,328 regulations which were adopted pursuant to Title II of the Land

323. See, e.g., U.S. Commercial Space Launch Competitiveness Act of 2015, Pub. L.
No. 114-90, 129 Stat. 704 (2015).
324. American Space Commerce Free Enterprise Act, H.R. 2809, 115th Cong. (2018).
This bill passed the House and was referred to the Senate in April 2018. See Actions
Overview H.R. 2809, supra note 298. It would provide for a faster licensing timeline and
put the burden on the government to prove why a company shouldn’t get a license, rather
than on a company for proving why it should. See also Scoles, supra note 319.
325. Space Frontier Act of 2019, S. 3277, 115th Cong. (2018). This bill passed the
Senate but failed in the House. Actions Overview S. 3277—115th Congress (2017-2018),
CONGRESS.GOV, https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/senate-bill/3277/actions
(last visited June 20, 2019).
326. DANIEL MORGAN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R45416, COMMERCIAL SPACE:
FEDERAL
REGULATION,
OVERSIGHT,
AND
UTILIZATION,
at
9
(2018),
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/space/R45416.pdf.
327. See Space Policy Directive-2, supra note 299.
328. Id. at 24901–02
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Remote Sensing Policy Act of 1992 (51 U.S.C. Chapter 601), and which
were last updated in 2006, almost fifteen years ago.
Commerce Secretary Wilbur Ross wasted no time, and in June 2018,
the department published an advance notice of proposed rulemaking.329
The comment period ran through the end of August 2018. According to
ACCRES meeting minutes, NOAA received a whopping total of 10
comments during the 2 month period, with the comments generally
focused on improving transparency in the licensing process, and
transitioning from a “one size fits all” model.330 According the Advisory
Committee on Commercial Remote Sensing, an entirely new set of
regulations has been drafted and was sent to the Office of Management
and Budget for review in late October 2018.331 NOAA’s goal appears to
be to publish final rules by the end of 2019.332
It is worth pausing a moment to consider the need for a
comprehensive “regulation re-write”333 of the commercial remote sensing
licensing scheme. The advance notice identified “ambiguities in the
current regulatory regime, many of which were unforeseeable even just a
few years ago” and offered the following specific examples:


Dramatic increase in the number of license applications



Increasing remote sensing capabilities in other countries



Cubesat constellations



Non-Earth imaging



Satellite servicing



Innovative systems capable of imaging in different spectral
bands



Live video broadcasting from space



Venture capital investment, including significant amounts
from foreign nationals and corporations



New entrants to space markets



Hosted payloads

329. Licensing Private Remote Sensing Space Systems, 83 Fed. Reg. 30592 (proposed
June 29, 2018) (to be codified at 15 C.F.R. pt. 960); see also MORGAN, supra note 326, at
9.
330. 24th Meeting of the ACCRES Committee, supra note 195, at 3.
331. See Foust, supra note 203; 24th Meeting of the ACCRES Committee, supra note
195, at 3.
332. 24th Meeting of the ACCRES Committee, supra note 195, at 3.
333. See Patel, supra note 320, at 3.
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Increasing use of public-private partnerships



Complex contractual relationships



Satellite servicing missions, including proximity operations



Ground station networks located in multiple countries with
different regulatory regimes



Launch vehicles imaging on orbit.334

It is interesting to note that the list did not mention the aggregation of
geolocation data, the increasing number of sensor-based devices using
commercial remote sensing data, such as IoT connected devices, or the
advent of 5G networks. Nor were the Strava or Polar global activity maps
referenced.
Not surprisingly, the private sector owners, operators and users of
satellite data have not shied away from criticizing the current regulatory
landscape. In 2016, DigitalGlobe CEO Walter Scott called for a rethinking
of the regulatory regime for RS satellites, and a reset of the national
security-commercial development balance, writing:
It’s time for the U.S. government to rethink the basic premise
underlying commercial remote sensing regulation. Instead of focusing
solely on the risks, acknowledge the benefits that widely available U.S.
commercial satellite imagery bring to national competitiveness.
Acknowledge that commercially available satellite imagery has proven
to be a great social benefit. Acknowledge that the U.S. space
technology edge has eroded, and satellite imagery is now available
from dozens of countries. Acknowledge that the feared dire risks from
the commercial availability of satellite imagery never materialized.
Acknowledge that U.S. industry has been very forward-leaning in
protecting national security through self-policing. Acknowledge that
the world has changed.335

To put it bluntly, the legal framework governing remote sensing
satellites was complicated, jurisdictionally limited, and arguably
ineffective in spotting national security interests before “sensored”
wearable devices and IoT products became features of our daily lives;
before commercial entities had the ability to aggregate geolocation and
other data from multiple app-based sources; and before recent advances in
enhanced imagery resolution, including increased pixelization. Thus, it
334. Licensing Private Remote Sensing Space Systems, 83 Fed. Reg. at 30592.
335. Walter Scott, U.S. Satellite Imaging Regulations Must Be Modernized,
SPACENEWS (Aug. 29, 2016) https://bit.ly/2He6sQV.
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may be an understatement to suggest that the regulatory regime is at a
breaking point.
D.

Data Aggregation Is a Persistent and Growing Concern

The national threat posed by commercial remote sensing data is not
decreasing or going away. The number of remote sensing satellites
operated by the United States public and private sectors is growing.336
Foreign states are similarly increasingly turning to remote sensing
satellites.337 In 2008, there were 100 satellites with this capability; by
2018, there were 300 remote sensing satellites.338 The number of countries
and multinational organizations that own or operate satellites is increasing
due to the increasing commercialization of space and affordable space
technology. Satellite ownership is no longer limited to a few space power
countries. In 2018, more than 50 countries and multinational organizations
owned or operated satellites.339 This persistent and growing challenge is
one that will only increase with the advent of 5G technology. 5G will
increase the number of satellites in orbit, expand the number of sensors
gathering – and sharing - geolocation and other data. 5G networks will
create civilian and military enterprises “teeming with constant rivers of
data.”340 And to top it off, China and other nations are developing quantum
computing satellites, with the capacity to capture and process vast amounts
of imagery data.341
Although the sections above examined how the U.S. military missed
the threat posed by aggregation of geolocation data and their data-driven
apps, it is important to note that not everyone in the U.S. government
missed the potential national security threat. A 2017 GAO report identified
“the geolocation capability of some IoT [Internet of Things] devices as a
particular concern—specifically, how the location of troops or personnel
could be revealed.”342 However, this recognition did not prevent the Strava
heatmap incident in January 2018. Nor did it prevent a similar incident

336.
337.
338.
339.
340.

See supra Part III.C.
See COMPETING IN SPACE, supra note 274, and accompanying text.
See COMPETING IN SPACE, supra note 274, at 1.
See id. at 2.
See John P. Thomas, 5G From Space: 20,000 Satellites to Blanket the Earth,
TECHNOCRACY (Jan. 8, 2019), https://bit.ly/2UEtpA9.
341. See COMPETING IN SPACE, supra note 274, at 8.
342. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-17-668, INTERNET OF THINGS:
ENHANCED ASSESSMENT AND GUIDANCE ARE NEEDED TO ADDRESS SECURITY RISKS IN
DOD 18 (2017), https://www.gao.gov/assets/690/686203.pdf; see also Jacob Meschke,
Pentagon Severely Restricts Fitness Trackers After Strava Heatmap Scandal, BICYCLING
(Aug. 10, 2018), https://bit.ly/2VtPMg7.
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with a global activity map prepared by Polar Fitness343 in July 2018. Using
the data from Polar’s Explore map, one could locate sensitive military sites
and find a user’s name and address, and users included military personnel
from various military and intelligence agencies.344
Quite possibly, the significance of the national security information
revealed by the heatmaps incidents may have provided the awakening
moment – or at least more concrete recognition – by the U.S. national
security establishment as to the scope and contours of a new type of threat:
a threat posed not by the direct actions of malicious states or groups, but
by simple commercial interests and a consumer desire for efficiency and
convenience. “The rapidly evolving market of devices, applications and
services with geolocation capabilities presents a significant risk to the
Department of Defense personnel on and off duty, and to our military
operations globally,” said Pentagon spokesman Army Col. Robert
Manning III on August 6, 2018.345 Thus, the question going forward is
how will the U.S. stem the “rising river of digital metadata” in a way that
protects national security interests, and relatedly, how will it prevent
malicious actors from dipping into that river of data.346
IX.

RECOMMENDATIONS

The recommendations offered below are nascent in scope and require
further consideration and development. However, the broad brushstrokes
seem appropriate as we work to bridge the legal and regulatory chasms in
this area while grappling with the powerful and transformative role that
remote sensing data plays in commercial, individual, and military
endeavors. We make these recommendations as a launching point for
further discussions and as a framework to begin development and eventual
implement of proposed policy and regulatory changes. We do so with full
understanding that any act that interferes with or disrupts the availability,
integrity and reliability of satellites and satellite data will have significant
impacts on our civilian and military realms.

343. See Andrew Liptak, Polar Fitness Suspends its Global Activity Map After Privacy
Concerns, THE VERGE (July 8, 2018), https://bit.ly/2KWo2LG.
344. See id.
345. See Jim Garamone, New Policy Prohibits GPS Tracking in Deployed Settings,
U.S. DEP’T OF DEF. (Aug. 6, 2018), https://bit.ly/2Gz1vAy.
346. See Patrick Turner, Strava’s Just the Start: The US Military’s Losing War Against
Data Leakage, DEF. ONE (Jan. 31, 2018), https://bit.ly/2vqCemM.
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Number 1: Revise the International Space Object Registry to
require more detailed and publicly available information about data
collection, use, aggregation, and dissemination.
We start with our most practical recommendation. Space object
registries should add requirements mandating that the owner/operator: (1)
identify the data that will be collected; (2) specify the intended use for the
data; (3) identify the entities with which the data will be shared or
disseminated; and (4) make that information transparent and publicly
available, wherever feasible. The lack of transparency in the current
international framework makes it difficult to anticipate, appreciate, or
respond to the privacy and national security risks presented by aggregation
of satellite generated data.
The U.N. maintains a Register of Objects Launched into Outer Space,
more colloquially referred to as the Space Object Register.347 The Register
was initially “established as a mechanism to aid the United Nations
Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space in its discussions on the
political, legal and technical issues concerning outer space” and has
become “a means of identifying which States’ bear international
responsibility and liability for space objects.”348 To be included in the
Register, the owner or operation must complete the “Registration
Information Submission Form,” available on the United Nations Register
of Objects Launched into Outer Space website, hosted by United Nations
Office for Outer Space Affairs (UNOOSA) website.349 The two-page form
requires only limited information on the launching state, the designator,
the date and territory or location of the launch, the basic orbital parameters,
any change of status, and the “general function of the space object.”350
There is no requirement to provide information as to the specifics of the
satellite’s function, or the type, use or dissemination of the data it will
gather.351

347. See United Nations Register of Objects Launched into Outer Space, U.N. OFFICE
https://bit.ly/2atzZrq (last visited June 20, 2019).
348. See id.
349. See Registration Information Submission Form, U.N. REGISTER OF OBJECTS
LAUNCHED INTO OUTER SPACE (Jan. 1, 2010), https://bit.ly/2UVRmIh.
350. See id.
351. See id.
FOR OUTER SPACE AFFAIRS,
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Number 2: Revise the U.S. licensing regime for commercial
remote sensing space objects to make the full licenses publicly
available absent significant concerns about national security or
international obligations.
The U.S. licensing regime for private remote sensing space systems
requires a significantly greater level of detail,352 including applicant
contact information (including foreign owners and lenders), launch
segment information, space segment information; ground segment
information; as well as other information. In particular, the application
requirements are quite robust and include: “system data collection and
processing capabilities”; “data distribution and archiving plans”; “plans
for providing access to or distributing the unenhanced data generated by
the system”; “a description of the plan for the sale and distribution of such
data”; and a “method for making the data available to governments whose
territories have been sensed.”353
The U.S. regulations require the license applicant to include specific
information in the application about data collection, use and
dissemination. Similarly, the regulations require the U.S. government to
include specific information in the approved license regarding data
collection, use and dissemination. However, the detailed information
about data collection, use and sharing generally is not available to the
public. Instead, the regulations require only that public summaries of
current commercial remote sensing licenses be posted on the Commercial
Remote Sensing Regulatory Affairs website.354 The summaries tend to be
less than one page in length, and lack detailed information about how the
satellite will collect, use, or share data.
For example, there are three public license summaries available for
DigitalGlobe on the CRSRA website. Each summary provides information
about the launch dates, orbital parameters, and image resolution.355
However, the public summaries contain no information about the use or
dissemination of the imagery data being collected. There is one interesting
statement in the public summary for the GeoEye Imagery Collection
System: “Due to U.S. licensing restrictions, commercial customers may
352. See Filing Instructions and Information, 15 C.F.R. pt. 960, app. 1 (2018).
353. See id.
354. See NOAA Licensees, NAT’L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN. (Apr. 17, 2019),
https://bit.ly/2J04Bk3.
355. See GeoEye-1 License, supra note 90; Private Remote Sensing System License
Public Summary (DigitalGlobe WorldView system), NAT’L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC
ADMIN. (2006), https://bit.ly/2XKj87x; Summary of Private Land Remote-Sensing Space
System License (DigitalGlobe), NAT’L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN. (2017),
https://bit.ly/2Pu5QJt.
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only receive imagery from GeoEye-1 at half-meter or greater ground
resolution.”356
The need for classification is understandable in many instances,
however, there are also instances when the full license can be made
publicly available, and in those instances, it should be. Commerce
Secretary Ross identified streamlining the regulatory process and
providing greater transparency to license applicants as priorities. That
transparency should be extended to the public so they understand how the
data being collected and shared—or sold—by the license applicant may
affect their privacy.
Number 3. Ensure that aggregation of satellite geolocation data
is on the agenda of international dialogues about cyber governance
and international security frameworks.
In 2018, the U.N. celebrated the 50th anniversary of the first United
Nations Conference on the Exploration and Peaceful Uses of Outer Space.
In the coming years, the Liability Convention and Registration Convention
will also celebrate 50 years. It is an opportune moment to ensure that
international dialogues about the use of outer space, satellites and remote
sensing include discussions of data aggregation, privacy interests and
national security.
Future international dialogue should build upon the
recommendations of the U.N. Group of Governmental Experts on
Transparency and Confidence-building Measures in Outer Space
Activities as expressed in its concluding report,357 published in July 2013.
Other international entities particularly well-poised to consider the issues
discussed in this article include the U.N. Group of Governmental Experts
on Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in
the Context of International Security, and the U.N.’s Working Group on
the “Space2030” Agenda.
Historically, these working groups and discussions have focused on
armed conflict scenarios in space and the weaponization of space objects
to achieve military ends. It is critical that these discussions move beyond
the armed conflict and use of force paradigms to appreciate the significant
threat posed, not by malicious nation state actors or rouge terrorist
organizations, but by the simple business decisions of private sector
entities with access to incredible amounts of satellite sourced data.

356. GeoEye-1 License, supra note 90.
357. G.A. Ses. 68/189, Group of Governmental Experts on Transparency and
Confidence-Building Measures in Outer Space Activities (July 29,
https://undocs.org/A/68/189.

2013),
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Number 4: Ensure that U.S. policymakers understand the
scope and scale of threats posed by the satellite-smart device
information nexus and amend the relevant U.S. authorities to correct
the disconnect between constitutional privacy, domestic electronic
surveillance laws, and satellite regulation.
Despite tremendous press coverage of the Strava incident, and recent
legislative efforts to revisit the balance between commercial interests and
national security,358 the U.S. government has failed to appreciate the
complexities posed by the commercial use, aggregation and sale of
satellite data. The Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy did not
include the word “satellite” or the term “remote sensing,” nor did the 2018
Summary of the Department of Defense Cyber Strategy.359 The 2018
National Cyber Strategy used the word satellite only once. In a section on
improving space cybersecurity, the strategy provided: “The
Administration is concerned about the growing cyber-related threats to
space assets and supporting infrastructure because these assets are critical
to functions such as positioning, navigation, and timing (PNT);
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR); satellite
communications; and weather monitoring.”360 The December 2018
“Competing in Space” report, prepared by the National Air and Space
Intelligence Center, did discuss satellites and remote sensing, however, it
focused on physical and cyber threats from malicious actors, notably
China and Russia.361 The Competing in Space report did not discuss the
Strava or Polar incidents, nor did it discuss how to address the cresting
wave of remote sensing data related to IoT and 5G.
We do not mean to the suggest the U.S. government is willfully
ignoring the problem. It is not. After the Strava and Polar incidents, the
Pentagon responded to the specific threat posed by the use of wearable
devices with geolocation features by servicemembers. On August 3, 2018,
the Pentagon issued a DOD Policy Memo that announced: “Effective
immediately, [Defense Department] personnel are prohibited from using
geolocation features and functionality on both non-government and
government-issued devices, applications, and services while in locations
designated as operational areas [].” 362 The memo directs prompt
358. See supra, Part VIII, section B.3., See also generally MORGAN, supra note 326.
359. See generally U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., SUMMARY: DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE CYBER
STRATEGY (2018), https://bit.ly/2OCwui5.
360. EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, NATIONAL CYBER STRATEGY OF THE UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA 10 (Sept. 2018), https://bit.ly/2xrQ0XK.
361. See generally COMPETING IN SPACE, supra note 274.
362. See Memorandum from the Deputy Sec’y of Def. to the Chief Mgmt. Officer of
the Dep’t of Def. et al., Use of Geolocation-Capable Devices, Applications, and Services
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development of geolocation risk management guidance and training and
mandates an update of the annual Cybersecurity Awareness training to
educate DoD personnel the risks posed by geolocation capabilities
embedded in devices and apps.363 Similarly, the GAO identified these
specific concerns in a July 2017 report, noting that “the geolocation
capability of some IoT [Internet of Things] devices as a particular
concern—specifically, how the location of troops or personnel could be
revealed.”364
The Pentagon’s prohibition, however, does not address the actual
problem. It fails to grasp the satellite-smart device information nexus, and
it bizarrely assumes that individuals are capable of controlling
“geolocation features and functionality” on a myriad of highly
sophisticated smart devices and apps. While the Pentagon policy changes
and the GAO reports are important developments, we are urging a larger
rethinking and recognition of the problem by the U.S. government.
Specifically, the U.S. government must take concrete actions to
understand and address the threats discussed in this paper.
First, on the policy side, those working on future National Defense
Strategy and Cyber Strategy documents must examine and address the
security challenges and civil liberties concerns posed by remote sensing
satellites. Likewise, given the President’s recent space-related
directives,365 we anticipate a new U.S. Space Policy document, designed
to replace the 2010 policy, is in the works. The new space policy document
must address the privacy and national security concerns posed by data
aggregation from remote sensing satellites. In a similar vein, NOAA’s
Advisory Committee on Commercial Remote Sensing (ACCRES) must
broaden its perspective to embrace both commercial interests and privacy
and civil liberties concerns. According to its website, ACCRES “evaluates
economic, technological, and institutional developments relating to
commercial remote sensing” and serves as “a forum for the discussion of
issues involving the relationship between industry activities and
(Aug. 3, 2018), http://bit.ly/2EiQovh [hereinafter Geolocation Memo]; see also Garamone,
supra note 345; Meschke, supra note 342.
363. See Geolocation Memo, supra note 362; see also Garamone, supra note 345.
According to news stories, the DoD is also considering limiting the apps that
servicemembers can use, mandating devices that show which apps allow third-party
siphoning and banning personal smartphones in the Pentagon, similar to the ban at CIA
headquarters. The DoD’s Defense Information Systems Agency, which serves as the
military’s IT department, is charged with leading this effort. See Tara Copp, Fitbits and
Fitness-tracking Devices Banned for Deployed Troops, Military Times (Aug. 6, 2018),
https://www.militarytimes.com/news/your-military/2018/08/06/devices-and-apps-thatrely-on-geolocation-restricted-for-deployed-troops/.
364. See Meschke, supra note 342.
365. See National Space Council Directives, OFFICE OF SPACE COMMERCE (2019),
https://bit.ly/2Pu6TZI.
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Government policies, programs, and regulatory requirements.”366 The
threat posed by aggregated satellite data to privacy and national security
must be part of its wheelhouse, and ACCRES’s committee membership
must include privacy and domestic surveillance experts.
Second, regulatory change is needed. A November 2018 CRS asked
whether and how the commercial space licensing process could be made
simpler, timelier, and more transparent.367 The response offered is telling:
Congressional attention to this question has focused, in large part,
on the process for interagency consultation on commercial
remote sensing licenses. The challenge for that process is
balancing industry’s need for timeliness and transparency with
the government’s need to meet national security and foreign
policy objectives. The rapidly advancing capabilities of foreign
government and commercial satellites make identifying the
appropriate balance more difficult, because if sensitive imagery
can be obtained elsewhere, prohibiting U.S. companies from
providing it may have few security benefits.368

Nonetheless, the on-going 15 C.F.R. 960 “re-write” of the
commercial remote sensing licensing scheme should try to strike the
balance correctly. The new rules should address the rapid and mindbinding technological developments that have exposed ambiguities in the
current regulatory scheme. In the addition, the new regulations should:
make the full license application and approved license publicly available
to the greatest extent possible; extend the annual congressional reporting
requirement, which is set to sunset in 2020; add an unclassified executive
summary, available to the public, as part of the annual report to Congress;
revise the license application requirements to specify data type, collection
method, whether and how the data will be aggregated with other sources
(if known), and how the data will be sold or disseminated.
Third, specific changes are needed in the legislative realm. The
disconnect between satellite regulation and domestic privacy and
electronic surveillance law must be addressed by Congress.
Comprehensive overhaul of the U.S. electronic privacy and surveillance
statutory scheme is long overdue. As we continue to move rapidly into 5G
platforms, smart cities, and our interconnected IoT universe, the satellitesmart device information nexus must be part of the regulatory and policy

366. See Advisory Committee on Commercial Remote Sensing, NAT’L OCEANIC &
ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., https://bit.ly/2Vj8U12 (last updated Oct. 11, 2018).
367. See generally MORGAN, supra note 326.
368. Id. at 24.
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framework. Satellites, generally, and commercial remote sensing,
specifically, provide the technical underpinnings and data that enable these
systems to function. But satellite-smart device data aggregation is not part
of our domestic privacy and electronic surveillance data framework. The
satellite-smart device information nexus must be part of our data law
framework. Here are two immediate steps to be taken: the FY20 National
Defense Authorization Act drafting process is well underway: in its
funding, planning and response, the NDAA must address the threat posed
by aggregation of satellite-smart device information nexus. Next,
Congress should to reintroduce and pass the Geolocation Privacy and
Surveillance Act or similar legislation to establish a legal framework for
when and how geolocation information can be accessed and used.
X.

CONCLUSION

Over time, therefore, the modern “use” of satellites has evolved into a
“reliance” upon them, which has graduated into a “dependence,” and
eventually generated a “vulnerability.” Potential adversaries, aware
of the technology patterns of the United States (and others), have come
to appreciate the suggestion that satellites may now be the Achilles
heel of the American civilian economy and its mighty military
apparatus.369

This article is an initial effort to frame, understand, and address the
vulnerabilities posed to individual privacy, civil liberties, and national
security by the satellite-smart device information nexus. The Strava
incident, by no means an isolated example, provided a moment of
recognition for scholars and policymakers as to the scope and contours of
a new type of threat: a threat posed not by the direct actions of malicious
states or groups, but by commercial interests and unaware consumers and
policy makers. Thus, the question going forward is: how will the U.S. and
the international community respond?
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